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Litigation-Fostered Bureaucratic Autonomy:
Administrative Law Against Political Control
Daniel E. Walters'
INTRODUCTION

Administrative law doctrines are widely assumed to be instruments of
political control of bureaucratic policymaking. On their face, they require
that agencies follow complex procedures in rulemaking, affording
interested parties a meaningful chance to make comments' and requiring
agencies to respond to such comments in issuing a final rule.2 They require
agencies to follow unambiguous statutory provisions and to provide a
reasonable interpretation of ambiguous statutory provisions.3 They further
require agencies to articulate a reasoned basis for their policy decisions and
to address alternative courses of action.4 These requirements grew out of a
fear of a roving, headless fourth branch of government and originally
manifested in attempts to give life to the non-delegation principle.' The
requirements eventually evolved into efforts to control bureaucratic
discretion and tether the administrative state to the preferences of elected
officials through more direct congressional or presidential control and
supervision of administrative agencies. 6 For years, theorists operating
under the rubric of "positive political theory" or "principal-agent" theory
have articulated this simple understanding of administrative law as
* J.D. 2012, University of Michigan Law School. Ph.D. student in political science at the
University of Wisconsin-Madison. A previous version of this Article won the American Constitution
Society's 2009 Richard D. Cudahy Writing Competition on Regulatory and Administrative Law
(Student Category). I am greatly indebted to all of the wonderful scholars who provided me with
valuable criticism (as well as moral support) during the long process of writing this Article. Donald
Downs, Jeb Barnes, Howard Gillman, and Phil Ethington helped me get the project off the ground, and
Nina Mendelson, Margaret Jane Radin, and the participants in the Fall 2011 Student Scholarship
Workshop at the University of Michigan Law School were extremely helpful in focusing the project
into current form.
1Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2006).
2 See, e.g., Reytblatt v. U.S. NRC, 105 F.3d 715, 722 (D.C. Cir.
1997) ("An agency need not
address every comment, but it must respond in a reasoned manner to those that raise significant
problems.").
Chevron U.S.A. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984).
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assoc. v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41-43 (1983).
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537-42 (1935). See also Lisa
Schultz Bressman, Schechter Poultry at the Millennium: A Delegation Doctrinefor the Administrative
State, 109 YALE L.J. 1399, 1403-08 (2000) [hereinafter Bressman, Schechter] (describing the
development of the nondelegation doctrine and courts' and scholars' eventual move to acceptance of
delegation as part of a political control framework).
6 See infra Part
Ill.A.
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political control,' and recent administrative law scholarship largely
endorses the "political control model," wherein the political branches rely
on administrative law doctrines to retain and exercise authority over
agency policy making. Even when the elected branches genuinely do not
care about specific policy outcomes, the idea of control still animates the
process-here, political control is effectuated by mechanisms for
encouraging interest group and public participation.9 In short, the idea of
control of bureaucratic discretion dominates our understanding of both
what administrative law does and what it should do.
This article argues that this political control model of administrative law
is incomplete and that a more realistic picture can be developed by
examining instances of what I call "litigation-fostered bureaucratic
autonomy"-the basic idea being that career agency staff (the purported
agents in the political control model) can and do use administrative
litigation to resist political directives with which they disagree. The
phenomenon of litigation-fostered bureaucratic autonomy can be seen
more clearly once we discard the oversimplified picture of the
administrative agencies as monolithic organizations. While many executive
agencies are formally housed in the executive branch and are, at least in
theory, subject to the control of political appointees (who are themselves
directly accountable only to the executive branch and removable at will),10
the clear principal-agent chain is thoroughly disrupted by the time we
reach the ground floor of the agencies, and resistance is bound to result
from the individual and institutional constraints that limit principals'

See infra Part III.A.
See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Proceduresas Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L.
REV. 1749 (2007) [hereinafter Bressman, Procedures]. But see Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond
Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 461
(2003) [hereinafter Bressman, Beyond Accountability] (noting that, in addition to delegation patrolling,
administrative law functions to ensure that agencies act reasonably and in a nonarbitrary fashion).
Professor Bressman's 2003 article was clearly a response to the dominance of the political control
model and simply sought to note that both political accountability and rationality animate
administrative law. Id. at 463.
9 See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105
HARV. L. REV. 1511 (1992) (arguing that agency processes are sites of deliberation that can lead the
agency's decision to best reflect the reasonable conclusions of the public); Richard B. Stewart, The
Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669 (1975) (arguing that
administrative law has come to reflect neopluralist values such as interest representation in agency
processes).
'o Nina A. Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies and Personnel Before a New
PresidentArrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 557, 581 (2003) ("Although she cannot legislate, the President
can, of course, hold an executive branch agency accountable through the power to replace the top
management of an agency.").
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ability to monitor agents.' Scholarship has long documented deep
divisions within agencies and, more importantly, between political
appointees and career staff.12
Once we acknowledge these persistent and pervasive divisions within
the administrative state, the challenge is to understand how the
multifarious groups and individuals within agencies assert their interests,
preferences, or views of the public interest. The concept of litigationfostered bureaucratic autonomy is a preliminary attempt to characterize one
particularly important but under-studied way that this resistance operates.
Rank-and-file bureaucrats are purposive actors themselves13 and have
historically used policy entrepreneurship and a variety of other informal
"subversive" techniques to develop a space for bureaucratic autonomy
against political principals.14 Litigation-fostered bureaucratic autonomy is
an extension of this theme of resistance, though the strategy differs from
previous accounts of resistance in the ways that it actually harnesses
important doctrines in administrative law and adapts them for the purpose
of dissent.
I argue that, contrary to the simplistic, traditional account of
administrative law as an instrument of political control, key administrative
law doctrines actually afford career staff strategic tools to vindicate their
losing viewpoint. The power of this strategy inheres in the fact that many
administrative law doctrines are built on the assumption of core notions of
reasonableness 5 that are anathema to internal division or dissonance.' 6
This foundation of rationality sets up a strategic incentive structure: If an
agency decision must be reasonable, a losing constituency in an agency
therefore only needs to somehow reveal evidence of dissonance in the
agency's decision-making process.
" Adam Shinar, Dissentingfrom Within: Why and How Public Officials Resist the Law, 40 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013).
12See infra Part L.A.
' It is fairly rare for administrative law scholarship to treat or acknowledge career staff as
purposive actors. But see Mendelson, supra note 10, at 612-16 (describing some of the "subversive"
activities of career staff during the transition to new presidential administrations); Shinar, supranote 12
(developing a theoretical account of why public officials in hierarchies might be inclined to resist
orders).
14 See infra Part LB (describing the various informal, non-legalistic mechanisms of resistance that
scholars have so far catalogued).
15See David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 159 (2010) (arguing that all of the
varying standards for review of agency action actually collapse into a core review for reasonableness).
16 An agency's interpretation of ambiguous statutes must be "reasonable." Chevron U.S.A. v.
NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844-45 (1984). An agency's exercise of policy discretion must be based on
a "rational connection between the facts found and the choice made." Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assoc. v.
State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
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Once the degree of dissonance hits a certain threshold, it becomes more
difficult for a court to avoid a conclusion that an agency's final choice was
arbitrary or unreasonable.' 7 While the result of vacatur is merely to return
policy to the status quo ante, this could be a substantial victory for career
staff in battles with aggressive political administrations.
The challenge for losing sub-constituencies is thus finding an effective
channel or mechanism for amplifying division. While a great deal of this
behavior is difficult to see, the incentives are undoubtedly there, and, as
this article shows through two case studies, the structure of the
administrative process and the practice of administrative litigation create
plenty of opportunities for career staff to reveal dissonance that could be
understood by judges as unreasonableness in the administrative process
sufficient to justify vacatur of rules.
Administrative litigation as a means of fostering bureaucratic autonomy
is certainly not used in every case. Arguably, it takes a lot of demonstrated
division for these mechanisms to produce a court decision vacating an
agency action. Yet the existence of even a few cases should capture the
attention of administrative law scholars and political scientists writing in
this field, especially when there are reasons to believe that the practice
could be operating mostly sub-legally (i.e., political officials would
presumably be aware of the dynamics of litigation-fostered bureaucratic
autonomy, and therefore would seek to head off controversy and engage in
deliberation and negotiation before staff resistance jeopardizes a rule) and
that this kind of strategic practice, even when not obvious on the face of
the record, is nevertheless important in a wide variety of administrative
contexts.
What practical import does this insight carry? What function
administrative law serves is, of course, an antecedent question to any
evaluation of administrative law, and evidence that administrative law is
used to undermine political accountability necessarily pulls us into debates
about the justification of the administrative state. This article will not wade
too deeply into this quagmire, but some attention to the question is
required and will be given in the concluding section of the article. It is
enough for now to say that, despite its tendency to undermine the lines of
'" Obviously, this effect will not appear in all cases. Arguably, judges might come to (or may
already) expect some level of dissonance. But as with all strategic tools, expecting this dynamic to
apply in all cases would be expecting too much-part of the effectiveness of the strategy is exercising
discretion in using it so as to preserve the vitality and force of the strategy when it is needed most.
Thus, we should really only expect to see the strategy utilized in exceptional circumstances, but we
should also understand that the threat can have deterrent value even when it does not materialize in
publicized conflict.
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political control on which traditional accounts of bureaucratic legitimacy
and administrative law are built, litigation-fostered bureaucratic autonomy
actually does lend democratic legitimacy to the administrative state. It can
empower potentially marginalized constituencies within an agency
(constituencies that often have unique and important perspectives on
important administrative matters), thereby enhancing the quality of
deliberation and simultaneously providing an internal check on
overreaching executive control. And though the costs of unconstrained and
excessive use of subversive tactics always pose a danger to the smooth and
effective functioning of government, there are nevertheless reasons to
believe that the tactics of litigation-fostered bureaucratic autonomy will be
only selectively employed.
Part I of this article will first lay out the evidence of intra-agency
dissent and will then develop the primary thesis that one of the principal
means by which career staff signal this dissent to judges is via
administrative litigation. Since career staff cannot sue their own agency,
they instead rely on opportunities for strategic cooperation with news
media and issue networks that document dissonance within agencies and
who in turn empower non-governmental actors, such as interest groups, to
challenge agency rules in court. This vicarious litigation strategy is, I
suggest, a fairly common method by which career bureaucrats protect and
enlarge their policy-making autonomy. I review two examples of career
staff actively working with media and public interest groups to undermine
an agency's final policy by highlighting evidence that the agency's process
was myopic or illegal in some respect. Together, these patterns lead to
what I call "litigation-fostered bureaucratic autonomy."
Part II will examine limitations on this behavior-namely, the potential
professional or legal repercussions that may have a chilling effect on such
behavior-concluding that political appointees lack either the will or the
capacity to police all such behavior, leaving career staff relatively free to
pursue the strategy of litigation-fostered bureaucratic autonomy. Part III
will engage in a more general reflection on the implications of all of this
strategic resistance for the literature's dominant "political control" model,
as well as its implications for agency process models of democratic
legitimacy. I argue that the dynamics of litigation-fostered bureaucratic
autonomy present serious descriptive challenges for these dominant
theoretical paradigms, at least insofar as litigation-fostered dynamics and
other related mechanisms of bureaucratic resistance occur fairly regularly.
Despite the incompleteness of the political control model, however, I argue
that litigation-fostered bureaucratic autonomy is a desirable feature of the
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administrative process because of its tendency to curb the excesses of
political principals and encourage public-interest-minded deliberation
about issues that are both highly technical and value laden.
I. INTERNAL DIVISION AND LITIGATION-FOSTERED BUREAUCRATIC
AUTONOMY

Though scholarship almost always treats administrative agencies as
cohesive and unitary,18 this Part argues for two critical departures from this
view. First, there is much evidence to suggest that agencies are themselves
internally fractured and frequently demonstrate conflict between various
constituencies within agencies. Second, much scholarship focuses on final
agency outputs and simply assumes that if another constituency within the
agency loses or is disappointed in the policy-making process, then that is
the end of the conflict. This Part argues that losing constituencies are, in
fact, purposive actors with a critical and powerful legal mechanism of
resistance at their disposal even after a rule is promulgated. This is what I
call "litigation-fostered bureaucratic autonomy": that is, the strategic use of
public dissent to undermine an agency's final decision under
administrative law doctrines that require that an agency's decision be
reasonable, non-arbitrary, and genuinely engaging of the full range of
regulatory options.
A. Conflict and InternalDivision in the Administrative State
In depicting the administrative state as internally divided, I do not paint
on a blank canvas. Legal scholars have, for their part, largely avoided the
issue, but political scientists and public administration scholars have long
noted the complex intra-institutional politics of agencies. Their studies
paint a picture of an administrative state that is more fractured and
complex than is often assumed in the hierarchical, linear principal-agent
model that dominates discussions of the theoretical foundations of
administrative law.
The differentiated preferences and opportunities for resistance are most
obvious at the lowest levels of the federal bureaucracy. Thus, Herbert
Kaufman's trailblazing study of the forest rangers "at the base of the

18 But see Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J.
1032 (2011) (defying this trend and asking administrative law scholars to pay greater attention to the
ways that administrative law doctrines strengthen certain parts of agencies (e.g., various professional
groups or different levels of management) and weaken other parts).

Litigation-FosteredBureaucraticAutonomy
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administrative pyramid"1 9 of the Forest Service at least acknowledged that,
though the Forest Service was remarkably unified (partly because of the
well-socialized culture of the agency), "[t]he influences on the decisions
and behavior of Rangers . .. come from four sources: higher head-quarters,
face-to-face work groups, local interests, and from 'inside' the Rangers
themselves."2 0 In other words, influence came not solely from political
direction, but also from individual Rangers' responses to their unique
regulatory environments.
The study of "street-level bureaucrats" positioned far away from the
central offices of the administration has likewise underscored the
tremendous amount of discretion that these actors possess to tailor
administration to the needs of clients and to their own preferences. 21 And
even though the sheer size of the bureaucratic hierarchy can explain a good
deal of the division and discretion within federal agencies, these patterns
do not begin and end at the street or enforcement level. Daniel Carpenter,
for instance, documents similar pockets of autonomy even at the higher
levels of the agency. He shows how influential managers within the
administration have frequently engaged in entrepreneurial networking and
reputation-building activities to carve out significant political autonomy
from political principals. 22 All of this evidence is consistent with the
traditional historical narrative of the development of the administrative
state: The passage of the Pendleton Act and the creation of the Civil
Service drove a wedge through the traditional linkage of administration
with patronage, freeing the energies of experts and policy visionaries and
often creating friction between these actors and political principals. 23
Whether the amount of division we actually see is consistent with the
expectations of civil service reform, the fact of division should hardly be
surprising-it is an integral feature of the American administrative state.
Indeed, the eminent bureaucracy scholar James Q. Wilson reminds us that
we can hope to understand the behavior of regulatory agencies only if we
"view these agencies as coalitions of diverse participants who have
19 HERBERT KAUFMAN, THE FOREST RANGER: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 5 (spec.

reprint ed. 2006).
2
0 Id. at 219.

21 MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY:

DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC

SERVICES (1980).
22 DANIEL

P.

CARPENTER,

THE

FORGING OF

BUREAUCRATIC

AUTONOMY:

REPUTATIONS,

NETWORKS, AND POLICY INNOVATION IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862-1928, at 353-54 (2001).

23Mendelson, supra note 10, at 612 ("Since the early 1900s, when the civil service was reformed
to eliminate the 'spoils system' and to create a civil service selected on the basis of merit
considerations, political appointees have faced a potentially uneasy relationship with the career civil
servants already in the bureaucracy.").
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somewhat different motives"-there are "careerists," "politicians," and
"professionals" all responding to a "political environment that provides a
changing pattern of rewards to each coalition member." 24
The implications of pervasive division can be serious and can lead to
endemic conflict. Hugh Heclo's study of presidential turnover yielded
something of an iron law: "Every new administration gives fresh impetus
to an age-old struggle . . . between political leadership and bureaucratic

power." 2 5 The causes of this struggle are myriad: a non-exhaustive list
would include insulation of career staff in particular agencies and even
particular programs, 26 ideological differences,27 role-perception, 2 8 selfinterest,29 professional norms, 30 agency culture and history, 3' differing time
horizons, 32 and even a sort of "agency esprit de corps." 3 3 In a very real
sense, civil servants are often different-demographically, politically, and
professionally-from their political principals in the White House and the
agency's central offices, and they can therefore be expected to actively
JAMES Q. WILSON, THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 373-74 (1980).
25HUGH HECLO, A GOVERNMENT OF STRANGERS: EXECUTIVE POLITICS INWASHINGTON 1 (1977).
26ROBERT MARANTO, BEYOND AGOVERNMENT OF STRANGERS: How CAREER EXECUTIVES AND
24

POLITICAL APPOINTEES CAN TURN CONFLICT TO COOPERATION 40 (2005) ("The very specialization of
bureaucracy and expertise of careerists understandably leads dedicated bureaucrats to consider their
area the most important in government. This lack of perspective often undermines their claims in the
eyes of politicians, for unlike bureaucrats, politicians can never give their hearts to just one cause [save
perhaps reelection].").
27 MARISSA MARTINO GOLDEN, WHAT MOTIVATES BUREAUCRATS?: POLITICS AND
ADMINISTRATION DURING THE REAGAN YEARS 26-27 (2000); MARANTO, supra note 27, at 41-45
(discussing evidence that "ideological differences between career and noncareer executives cause
considerable tension, particularly in social welfare and regulatory agencies"); Joel D. Aberbach & Bert
A. Rockman, Clashing Beliefs Within the Executive Branch: The Nixon Administration Bureaucracy,
70 AM. POL. SC. REV. 456, 466 (1976).
28GOLDEN, supra note 28, at 20-25 (synthesizing research suggesting that bureaucrats are uniquely
motivated by the public interest and a desire to "do the right thing").
29 Id. (describing rational choice theories of bureaucratic behavior, which posit that career staffs are
probably most interested in increasing the agency budget and maximizing job security or leisure time).
30Id at 27 (noting that various professional constituencies within agencies may be more or less
adept at using methods of resistance).
" Id. at 27-28 (noting the way that important historical events-for instance, the explosion of the
space-shuttle Challenger-canpath-dependently alter the culture of an agency, making them more or
less resistant to risky policy change).
32 Id. at 23-28. The importance of this point cannot be overstated, especially because this article
argues for the importance of litigation as a tool of bureaucratic autonomy. Litigation can obviously take
years, and so agency staff with a longer time horizon than a passing political administration has a
distinct advantage in a war of attrition over a rule-simply waiting out a political administration may
be a viable option, and this certainly gives additional force to the litigation-fostered bureaucratic
autonomy thesis. In fact, it may give agents such a distinct advantage that it poses problems for a
democratic justification of the process. For an argument that this is not the case, see Part Ill.B.3.
3 Id. at 28-29 (noting the ways that agencies with a strong sense of collective mission may be less
loyal to presidential administrations and more able to overcome collective action problems, thus
leading to a greater likelihood of collective resistance).
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seek out opportunities for resistance when specific policy initiatives clash
with their preferences.
The most common analysis of this division between political
constituencies and career constituencies is that it is a problem to be solved,
as the division creates substantial risk of shirking or sabotage, reflecting
the increasing distrust of bureaucracy seen in the highly influential public
choice literature. 34 However, many public administration scholars have
argued that because of civil servants' professional training and the
organizational emphasis on the public interest in agencies, civil servants
are unlikely to over-utilize methods of resistance. 5 I discuss the idea of
internal division in bureaucracy not to engage in a normative evaluation of
this division, but rather to observe that the idea of internal division itself,
especially between "career" and "political" types of actors, has long been
recognized in the literature and is an ever-present reality in bureaucratic
policymaking. Whether such divisions are based on presumably noble
notions of professionalism or of the public interest or on presumably
ignoble notions of protecting an agency's turf,36 enlarging the agency's
budget, 3 7 or advancing one's own self-interest 38 is largely beside the point
here. The point is simply that agencies are, quite naturally, internally
divided.3 9
Heclo's account of a divided administrative state certainly resonates
today. Perhaps no administration will be remembered more for division
3 HECLO, supra note 26, at 236-49 (recognizing the need for reform and giving his own thoughts
for finding a middle way); JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES Do
AND WHY THEY Do IT 196-202 (1989) (describing the divisions between political executives and
career executives and the possible implications of these divisions on management style and regulatory
effectiveness). See generally Sidney A. Shapiro & Ronald F. Wright, The Future of the Administrative
Presidency: Turning AdministrativeLaw Inside-Out, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 577, 596-97 (2011).
3 See, e.g., GOLDEN, supra note 28, at 21, 151-52 (arguing that most civil servants most of the
time seek to accommodate political direction with which they disagree); WILLIAM T. GORMLEY, JR. &
STEVEN J. BALLA, BUREAUCRACY AND DEMOCRACY: ACCOUNTABILITY AND PERFORMANCE 41-48 (2d
ed. 2008).
36WILSON, supra note 35, at 28 ("Executives, in trying to maintain their agencies [and their own
position in them], worry about retaining control over their turf-a popular bureaucratic word for what I
call 'autonomy.' No agency has or can have complete autonomy, but all struggle to get and keep as
much as they can.").
3 See, e.g., ANTHONY DowNs, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY (1967); WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR.,
BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1971).
3 D. RODERICK KIEWIET & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE LOGIC OF DELEGATION:
CONGRESSIONAL PARTIES AND THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS 5 (1991).
3 It becomes more relevant-perhaps even decisive-when we turn to the normative question in
Part IllI.B-C. If public administration scholars are right that civil servants will not always push every
possible disagreement to impasse or engage in sabotage, then the democratic legitimacy of methods of
resistance such as litigation-fostered bureaucratic autonomy is less in question. I argue in that Part that
litigation-fostered bureaucratic autonomy will not be over-utilized and hence retains legitimacy.
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within agencies than the George W. Bush administration. As Freeman and
Vermeule show, there were "suggestions of widespread tampering" with
global warming-related information in administrative agencies, and there
can be no doubt that "[e]pisodes such as this apparently created significant
tension between career agency staff and political appointees."40 Indeed,
though Freeman and Vermeule's focus is almost entirely on showing the
intense division between agency scientists and the administration on the
global warming question, they also note other instances of division,
including the administration's efforts to silence a Department of
Agriculture employee's warnings about antibiotic-resistant bacteria and the
"directives made by political appointees to botanists, biologists, and
ecologists in the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service . . . to refrain 'for
nonscientific reasons . . . from making . . . findings that are protective of

[endangered] species."' 4 1 Also well known were the administration's
efforts to institute a form of "peer review" which would have actually
"barred agency scientists, or any scientist funded by the agency (no matter
how indirectly), from participating in the peer review process, with no such
bar applying to industry scientists,"42 as well as the efforts to use the White
House's Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) to "exert
more centralized political control over agency staff."43
This type of aggressive political control of agency career staff, though
perhaps more extreme during the Bush administration, is not atypical, and
the successive years of clashes with political principals have certainly
taken their toll on career staff and have engendered consistent feelings of
differentiation, at least within social welfare and regulatory agencies. In the
latest update of its ongoing survey research of scientists in federal
administrative agencies across administrations, the Union of Concerned
Scientists reported striking evidence of widespread dissatisfaction among
employees in a variety of agencies: 33% of EPA scientists surveyed
"disagreed that the EPA was acting effectively to 'clean up and/or mitigate
existing pollution or environmental problems"'; 39% of FDA scientists
"disagreed that the 'FDA is acting effectively to protect public health';
69% of FWS scientists "disagreed that the FWS is acting effectively to
preserve endangered or threatened species"; and 70% of NMFS scientists
claimed that "they did not trust 'NOAA Fisheries decision makers to make
40

sUP.

Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 2007

CT. REV. 51, 55.
41 Id. at 56.
42 Id. at
57.
43

Id. at 58.
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decisions that will protect marine resources and ecosystems. "4 These
numbers are representative and fairly consistent over time.45
Not surprisingly, all of this internal disaffection means that certain
constituencies within agencies oftentimes find better friends and more
fruitful means of resistance outside the agency, for instance in interactions
with interest groups, congressional committees, the media, or regulated
industry. Again, political scientists, economists, and public administration
scholars have done some work in identifying and documenting the
empirical regularity of modes of inter-institutional resistance to political
administration. Most administrative law scholars are familiar with the idea
that many agencies are "captured" by the industries they are charged with
regulating.4 6 That is, agency staffers develop mutually beneficial working
relationships with regulated firms, resulting in overly lax regulation and
disregard of public preferences. Perhaps an equally well-known
phenomenon demonstrating these inter-institutional dynamics is the socalled "iron triangle" or "subsystem" theory.4 7 According to the "iron
triangle" theory, parts of administrative agencies enter into cooperation
with congressional committees overseeing the agency as well as with
interest groups. Together, the three actors can create a permanent
"subgovernment" which pursues the collective interests of the three actors
even though those interests "might be opposed by other subparts of the
institutions and are not endorsed by the larger institution within which
those subunits operate."4 8 More recent research suggests that the iron
triangle phenomenon might be less prominent than a related but very
different pattern of "issue network" influence, involving large, fluid
coalitions of technical experts that combine to influence agency

4 UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, Voices of FederalScientists: Americans' Health and Safety
Depends on Independent Science, at 2 (Jan. 2009), http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/
scientificjintegrity/Voices ofFederalScientists.pdf.
4MARANTO, supra note 27, at 43 (reporting survey responses by career staff in social welfare and
regulatory agencies to the question of whether "political appointees and career executives agreed on
policy goals" and finding that the percentage agreeing with this claim ranged from 20% in the first
Reagan administration to 39% in the Clinton administration).
46 See, e.g., MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 3-4
(1955).
4 See, e.g., DOUGLAS CARTER, POWER IN WASHINGTON: A CRITICAL LOOK AT TODAY'S
STRUGGLE TO GOVERN IN THE NATION'S CAPITAL (1964); THEODORE J. LOWi, THE END OF
LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES (2nd ed. 1979).
4 M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation ofPowers Law, 150 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 603, 646 (2001). See generally FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER & BETH L. LEECH, BASIC INTERESTS:
THE IMPORTANCE OF GROUPS IN POLITICS AND IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 120-26 (1998) (reviewing the
subsystems literature).
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policymaking, 4 9 but the larger point remains: There is differentiation across
groups within agencies and enough discretion at various levels of the
bureaucracy that disaffected career servants can and do combine with
actors outside the agency in an effort to influence policy outcomes. All of
this points the way to the specific dynamics of litigation-fostered
bureaucratic autonomy, which similarly see bureaucrats interacting with
outside groups to influence policy through legal challenges of rules.
B. Administrative Law and Empowerment of Career Staff The Dynamics
ofLitigation-FosteredBureaucraticAutonomy
If, as seems to be the case, career staff frequently find themselves at
odds with political principals over agency goals and specific regulatory
programs, a question inevitably arises: How can these losing constituencies
within agencies vindicate their preferences? If they fail to protect their
interests in the rulemaking process, are they just out of luck? We know that
they can seek the help of Congress, but Congress may be apathetic about
the problem, be shackled by inertia, or actually agree with the political
position ultimately taken by the political principals. Career staff can
engage in overt resistance by defying the policy (though that strategy is
risky), or they can fight back more subtly by interpreting the winning
policy narrowly.50 Or, as some have argued, the best long-term strategy for
losing constituencies might be to do as much as they can to compromise
and cooperate with their political principals," even if those political
principals are unwilling to meet them in the middle. For many career civil
servants, particularly those "lifers" who are most likely to see an
aggressive political administration as a threat to their life's work, there will
be sufficient motivation in a "sense of commitment to civil service" and
"willingness to supply 'responsiveness to the legitimate political leaders of
the day"' to put differences aside and cooperate as much as possible.5 2
Yet career employees do have at least some opportunity to resist
political control.
Professor Nina Mendelson's study of "agency
burrowing" notes the ways that outgoing presidential administrations may
49 Marisa Martino Golden, Interest Groups in the Rule-Making Process: Who Participates?Whose
Voices Get Heard?, 8 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 245, 249 (1988).
'o Shinar, supra note 12.
" GOLDEN, supra note 28, at 152 (finding that this was the dominant strategy of career staff in the
National Highway Traffic Administration during the Reagan administration); HECLO, supra note 25.
52Mendelson, supra note 10, at 615.
5 See, e.g., GOLDEN, supra note 28, at 16-20 (describing various mechanisms of resistance ranging
from exit in protest to strategies of "voice" including "sabotage, the deliberate slowdown of agency
activity [sometimes referred to as foot-dragging], 'guerilla warfare,' leaking, and whistle-blowing").
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solidify the tenure of allies in administrative agencies in hopes that their
allies will act "subversively" in a new administration.54 For instance, such
allies could "let an assignment fall between the cracks or simply fail to
perform a disliked task promptly."55 They could "fail to be energetic or
entrepreneurial on behalf of the new President's agenda."5 6 To the extent
that an agency's work is decentralized and depends on ground-level staff to
identify regulatory agenda items, a career employee could decline to notify
superiors of opportunities to pursue the President's regulatory agenda.57
Even when a particular policy is forced on agency staff, nothing prevents
them from laying the groundwork for implementation of their preferred
policy positions for future, more receptive political administrations.
Finally, career staffers may more actively "throw a 'wrench in the works'
by leaking information to discredit a person or agency." 59 Overall, there is
substantial evidence that career staff do in fact avail themselves of these
methods of resistance,

though public administration scholars divide on

how pervasive these activities are in the vast business of administrative
61
agencies.
All of these options, if acted on frequently, could have some effect on
the realization of a President's regulatory agenda. At the same time,
however, it would be difficult to say that a career staffer's employment of
these strategic tools could single-handedly change an adverse regulatory
54See Mendelson, supra note 10, at 612.

ss Id.; see also Anthony M. Marino, John G. Matsusaka & Jan Zabojnik, Disobedience and
Authority, 26 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 427, 428 (2010) (acknowledging a need to account for "lackluster
effort" or "ineffective enforcement" by agents).
56See Mendelson, supra note 10, at 612.
s7 Id. at 613.
ss See Lisa Heinzerling, Presentation for the Environmental Law and Policy Program at the
University of Michigan Law School: Climate Change and the EPA (Nov. 17, 2011),
http://web.law.umich.edulflashmedia/public/Default.aspx?mediaid=1868 (discussing the ways that the
Office of Transportation and Air Quality in the EPA responded to President George W. Bush's
complete dismissal of their greenhouse gas rule by unilaterally supplementing the dossier with new
studies and models which ultimately made immediate promulgation possible once the Obama
administration took over).
59Id.; see also GOLDEN, supra note 28, at 153 (concluding that in the EPA during the Reagan
administration, a "group of 'mavericks' strenuously resisted the Regan administration and its policies"
by "repeatedly leak[ing] and blow[ing] the whistle").
60MARANTO, supra note 26, at 38 (noting that, in a data set of interviews from 1999-2000, 8 of 35
political appointees "noted specific instances in which career officials withheld information, or in other
ways worked against appointee initiatives, because of either policy conflict or battles over who should
control the organization").
61 Compare GOLDEN, supra note 27, at 154 ("[T]he research presented in this book and
summarized here suggests that upper-level career civil servants are more responsive than resistant to
the president and his appointed deputies."), with ROSEMARY O'LEARY, THE ETHICS OF DISSENT:

MANAGING GUERILLA GOVERNMENT (1st ed. 2005) (finding subversive action to be commonplace in
the administrative state).
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outcome. Most of these tools apply primarily in the policy-formation
process, and in most cases a determined President will be able to push
through a desired policy against the will of even the most intransigent
career bureaucrats. Thus, the existence of a tool with real legal force would
be fundamentally different in both kind and degree from the currently
recognized tools of bureaucratic resistance, thereby meriting greater
attention.
One such option that students of administrative law would probably not
point to is administrative litigation. Yet, as this section demonstrates,
perhaps they ought to. Administrative litigation not only provides the legal
force that bureaucrats need, but also extends the timeframe for dissent past
the agency's final action. 62 Thus, as the following case studies show, the
informal methods of dissent that most agree occur at least some of the time
can gain considerable legal force when they find their way into legal fora.
1. EndangeredSpecies Act Litigation
One of the most politicized administrative agencies during the George
W. Bush administration was the Department of the Interior (DOI). Reports
of questionable interference by political appointees in a variety of leasing
matters and scientific issues clouded the agency's reputation throughout
the Bush administration's tenure, ultimately reaching a high-water mark
when, in 2007, a deputy assistant secretary for Fish and Wildlife and Parks
at DOI, Julie MacDonald, was forced to resign amidst accusations that she
had "personally reversed scientific findings, changed scientific conclusions
to prevent endangered species from receiving protection, removed relevant
information from a scientific document, and ordered the Fish and Wildlife
Service (FWS) to adopt her edits."63 As early as 2004, MacDonald was
targeted for her role in heavily editing scientific findings in a leaked draft
of an FWS biological opinion on the ESA and the sage grouse. 4 Starting in
late 2006, the criticism picked up as the Union of Concerned Scientists
began to drum up support for an investigation into MacDonald's activities
after "[d]ocuments . . . obtained by several conservation organizations
62 Leaks that provoke congressional oversight hearings also allow for this extension of constraints
beyond the promulgation of the agency's rule, but, unlike congressional oversight hearings, litigation is
likely to be more time consuming and more threatening to the rule, especially if the court vacates the
rule.
63 Press Release, Union of Concerned Scientists, Systematic Interference with Science at Interior
Department Exposed (Oct. 30, 2006), http://www.ucsusa.org/news/pressjrelease/systematicinterference-with.html [hereinafter, Systematic Interference].
6 Leaked FWS Analysis Indicates GreaterSage Grouse Decision Tainted by Politics, SAGEBRUSH
SEA CAMPAIGN, http://www.sagebrushsea.org/leaked FWS-analysis.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2011).
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show[ed] that MacDonald, an engineer with no training in biology, and
other Interior officials personally edited scientific documents to change the
conclusions of wildlife biologists with FWS regarding what species are
eligible for Endangered Species Act protection."" All told,
[h]undreds of pages of records, obtained by environmental
groups through the Freedom of Information Act,
chronicle[d] the long-running battle between MacDonald
and Fish And Wildlife Service employees over decisions
whether to safeguard plants and animals from oil and gas
drilling, power lines, and real estate development, spiced
by her mocking comments on their work and their
frequently expressed resentment.66

-

Further demonstrating the ways that strategic information leaks can be
used by pro-regulatory or anti-regulatory forces is the fact that MacDonald
was also accused of leaking information to interested organizations such as
the California Farm Bureau Federation and the Pacific Legal Foundation.67
Amidst the interest group and media attention to these accusations of
scientific impurity and after an anonymous complaint from within DOI, the
agency's Office of Inspector General (OIG) initiated a formal investigation
into MacDonald's conduct. 8 OIG's inspection revealed that MacDonald's
intrusive behavior had "demoralized the FWS program" and that "many of
the field biologists had expressed concerns similar to the OIG
complainant." 69 Indeed, the report catalogues the statements of multiple
DOI officials, virtually all confirming that MacDonald had manipulated the
work of career staff. The FWS Director, Dale Hall, confirmed he had
"been involved in a 'running battle' with MacDonald over the chain of
command in FWS and her repeated attempts to circumvent it." 70 Even in
this report, evidence abounds that career staff felt a need to build a record
of the political manipulation, presumably for strategic purposes. Hall noted
65Systematic

Interference, supra note 64.
Eilperin, Bush Appointee Said to Reject Advice on EndangeredSpecies, WASH. POST, Oct.
30,
2006,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/29/
AR2006102900776.html.
67 Report: Interior Official Blastedfor Twisting EnvironmentalData, USA TODAY, Mar. 29, 2007,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2007-03-29-interiorN.htm?csp=15.
68 Id.
66 Juliet

6' DEP'T OF INTERIOR, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., INVESTIGATIVE REPORT ON ALLEGATIONS
AGAINST JULIE MACDONALD, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, FISH, WILDLIFE & PARKS 5, available

at http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/swcbd/PROGRAMS/esa/pdfs/doi-ig-report-jm.pdf.
'o Id. at 16.
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that when MacDonald decided to unilaterally lower from 2.1 miles to 1.8
miles field biologists' determination of the Southwest Willow Flycatcher's
flying radius, he "told the field staff to inform her of the science behind
their findings, and if she still said to make the change, to go ahead and do
so-but to document everything."7 1
The MacDonald episode shows how personnel within agencies can gear
up for legal fights, but we now turn to other cases that show how career
staff in agencies can use their knowledge of the political manipulation to
influence ESA listing litigation, overcoming the presumption of deference
accorded to DOI's official scientific opinion (i.e., the marked-up versions
attributable to the political administration). Though it is not possible to
document every example of this dynamic-partly because listing cases are
so common-a few cases are particularly clear in demonstrating the ways
that agency staff can use litigation to resist political direction.
In 2005, the Ninth Circuit decided that the failure of the National
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) to analyze the impact of a proposed
irrigation project on habitat of the threatened coho salmon was arbitrary
and capricious. 72 Despite being a fairly run-of-the-mill Endangered Species
Act case-agencies are required to conduct a formal consultation and
provide a "biological opinion" that utilizes the "best available science" 73 if
a proposed action threatens a listed species-the case is notable for the
way that attorneys from interest groups used the dissenting opinion of one
particular NMFS scientist to sway the court. In 2001, Mike Kelly was
appointed as the "technical lead" on the team of scientists assigned to write
a biological opinion (BiOp).74 The team's first draft BiOp concluded that
the proposed irrigation project would, in fact, jeopardize the coho salmon,
but the Department of Justice apparently nixed the BiOp. 5 Kelly's team
then proposed a second BiOp, which did not represent Kelly's preferred
position but still satisfied him as being "legitimate." 7 6 At this point, the
issue was essentially taken from the scientists. According to Kelly, the
team heard that the Bureau of Reclamation and/or DOI believed that the
71
72

Id. (emphasis added).
Pac. Coast Fed'n of Fishermen's Assocs. v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 426 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir.

2005).
7

1Id. At 1085.
74 Narrative

Statement of Michael S. Kelly, PEER, http://www.peer.org/docs/noaal
kellynarrative.pdf, at I (last accessed Dec. 4, 2012) [hereinafter Narrative Statement]; Testimony of
Mike
Kelly,
PEER,
http://www.peer.org/docs/noaa/07_30_07_mike kelly-testimony-nr.
committee.pdf, at 2 (last accessed Dec. 4, 2012) [hereinafter Testimony].
75

Narrative Statement, supra note 74, at 3; Testimony, supra note 74, at 3.

76 Narrative

Statement, supra note 74, at 3.
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team was "stonewalling" the project.n From that point on, the team's voice
was essentially silenced. As Kelly recalled, "It is clear to me that someone
at a higher level had ordered us to accept the proposed [Reasonable
Prudent Alternative] regardless of whether there were arguments that we
could make to analyze this heretofore unanalyzed risk to the species."78
Ultimately, the agency rammed through a BiOp that differed in important
respects from the ones developed by the team.7 9
Had the story ended there, it would have been unremarkable-it would
merely be evidence that scientists in agencies do not always get what they
want. Instead, Kelly decided to fight back. First, he asked to be relieved of
his duties on the team. Kelly testified, "I . . . hoped that my refusal to

participate would apply some 'back pressure' up the chain of command. I
expected that it would be untenable to develop a BiOp without a staff
biologist."80 Ultimately, the strategy of insubordination did not work-in
fact, Kelly received an award for his work on the project 81-so Kelly filed
for whistleblower protection even when there was no retaliation.82 With the
aid of a California branch of the scientific independence watchdog Public
Employees for Environmental Responsibility (PEER)," Kelly lodged a
formal disclosure with the DOI's Office of Special Counsel (OSC),
complaining of the political manipulation he had experienced.8 4 OSC then
decided not to investigate, noting that the proper forum for resolution of
Kelly's allegations was a challenge of the agency's action in federal court
and that the OSC could not be the "arbiter of 'conflicting science.'""' Take
the issue to federal court is precisely what Earthjustice and a number of
other environmental groups did. Part of Earthjustice's case was "fill[ing]
'significant gaps in the administrative record,"' and a federal magistrate
judge agreed with Earthjustice that this could be accomplished by an order
nId. at 4.
75
Id. at 5.
' Id. at 5-8.
so Testimony, supra note 74, at 4.
81

Id.

Id.
PEER is a non-profit organization dedicated to monitoring natural resource
management
agencies and committed to "[d]efend[ing] and strengthen[ing] the legal rights of public employees who
speak out about issues concerning natural resource management and environmental protection." About
Us, PEER, http://www.peer.org/about/index.php (last accessed Dec. 4, 2012). See also John McArdle,
'Being Disliked, but Feared' Is Swaggering Advocacy Group's Ambition, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/05/24/24greenwire-being-disliked-but-feared-is-swaggeringadvoca-61492.html.
84 Press Release, PEER, Whistleblower Testifies Against Agency in Klamath Fish Kill (Mar. 19,
2003), http://www.peer.org/news/news-releases/2003/03/19/whistleblower-testifies-against-agency-inklamath-fish-kilV.
82

8

85 Id.
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to the defendant agencies (NMFS and BOR) to allow Earthjustice to
depose Kelly. 8 6 The magistrate judge added:
This court finds significant gaps in the administrative
record . . . . The court is not obligated to accept the

agency's contention that the administrative record is
complete, especially when there is evidence of internal
dissentfrom the ultimate decision. The agency should not
be permitted to deny the existence of an internal dispute by
suppressing the evidence of it.

. .

. In the case at bar, this

court should supplement the administrative record by
including evidence of all points of view, not just those that
support the final decision of the agency.87
Of course, Kelly appeared as a nominally adverse party at the
deposition, but his testimony was clearly damning to the defendants.
Notably, PEER attorneys sat in on the deposition to advise Kelly of his
best interest in terms of employment in the agency. Ultimately, the
litigation was largely shaped by Kelly's accusations: Earthjustice and the
other environmental plaintiffs framed Kelly's testimony as helping to shine
6

9 1id.
87 Brief

for Plaintiff-Appellants at 27, Pac. Coast Fed'n of Fishermen's Assocs. v. U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation, 426 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2005) (Nos. 03-16718, 03-16863), 2004 WL 540065 (quoting
magistrate judge's order of Feb. 19, 2003) (emphasis added).
8
Deposition
of
Mike
Kelly,
PEER
3,
9-10
(Mar.
7,
2003),
http://www.peer.org/docs/noaa/MKelly-Depo.pdf. A PEER attorney, Dan Meyer, explained the rather
odd capacity in which he appeared as follows:
I just wanted the record to clarify the difference . . . to make sure that people
understood my role as counsel to [Kelly] in this deposition, is primarily in the
context of 5 CFR 2635, which are the regulations that govern the ethical actions
of Federal employees; so I'm here as an employment counsel, not as an
environmental counsel. So if you hear me object, it will be me advising my client
in the context of his employment with the federal government. Now, this could
just as easily have been done by, say, the agency's ethics officer. That's not
routinely done by the federal government. So once in a while a PEER member
will come to us and say, "Hey, I've got to give a deposition and I just don't
know how my employment interest is watched out for during that process; would
you sit in as my counsel." So some people are kind of confused about why is
there a PEER attorney here. It's because I'm here to advise [Kelly] on the proper
stance an employee takes as a member of the federal workforce in these
situations.

Id.
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light on impermissible political interference in the BiOp process" and a
"gaping hole" in the record, 90 and the government defendants attempted to
discredit the importance of Kelly's opinion by arguing that internal dissent
is "inevitable" and ultimately healthy for deliberating agencies.
Originally, the district court held that one part of the proposed RPAthe plan ultimately created by NMFS-was arbitrary and capricious, but
that two other components of the plan were not arbitrary and capricious
despite the fact that the BiOp "does not explicitly engage in an analysis of
what effect [these components of the RPA] will have on the coho salmon
or their critical habitat." 9 2 On appeal, the environmental petitioners
challenged this holding, arguing that flows relied on "were the same flows
rejected by the NMFS as insufficient in its review of the BOR's biological
assessment." 9 3 Applying hard look review, the Ninth Circuit concluded that
the federal agencies had altogether failed to provide a missing linkindeed, the missing link flagged by Kelly throughout the process-in the
regulatory logic justifying the RPA: "The BiOp contains no analysis that
suggests that the agency determined that, during the eight-year period
encompassed by Phases I and II, the coho would receive sufficient
protection against jeopardy under the proposed plan of operations." 94 In
fact, the court noted that "the agency's decision appears to conflict with the
analysis in the BiOp." 95 In the end, Mike Kelly played a critical role in
8 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellants, supra note 87, at 28 ("Kelly's accusations provide insider
evidence from a scientist who was involved in the decision-making process that the opinions of
[NMFSJ's] biologists may have been sidestepped and ignored -evidence [sic] that relevant factors were
not considered. This is not a case of an outside third party making accusations based on speculation.
Kelly, who was directly involved in the agency's decision-making process, offers evidence that
improper political pressure led an agency to ignore its own scientists and implement a plan which
jeopardizes a threatened species and violates federal law.").
'o Id. at 27 ("The gaping hole in the record is explained by the testimony of Michael S. Kelly,
NMFS's former lead biologist working on the Klamath BiOp. In late October 2002, Mr. Kelly filed a
formal whistleblower complaint with the U.S. Office of Special Counsel, asserting that the agency
failed to follow its mandate to pursue scientifically based decision-making. Mr. Kelly alleged that
pressure from BOR prevented NMFS from applying the best available science and from properly
analyzing the final RPA.").
' Brief for Defendants-Appellees at 35-36, Pac. Coast Fed'n of Fishermen's Assocs. v. U.S.
Bureau of Reclamation, 426 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2005) (No. 03-16718), 2004 WL 1125519 (quoting
Nat'l Fisheries Inst. v. Mosbacher, 732 F. Supp. 210, 227 (D.C. Cir. 1990)) ("[A] certain amount of
disagreement among the countless individuals involved in developing or commenting on the [agency's
decision] is inevitable and indicates that the debate was as open and vigorous as Congress intended.").
An intervenor, the Klamath Water Users Association, also discussed the Kelly deposition, attacking
Kelly as a "disgruntled former NMFS employee." Brief for Defendant-Intervenor-Appellees at 20-21,
Pac. Coast Fed'n, 426 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2005), 2004 WL 1125520.
92PoC. Coast Fed'n, 426 F.3d at 1089.
93Id.
94 Id. at 1092.
95Id.
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killing this highly politicized affront to career staff by bringing evidence of
the administration's steamrolling before the court and challenging the court
to call the agency's bluff.
The story of Mike Kelly is but a small, and hardly abnormal, piece of
evidence of the dynamics of litigation-fostered bureaucratic autonomy at
work in the Department of the Interior during the Bush administration. In
fact, in the year after the Pacific Coast Federation decision, NMFS
decided to delist the coho salmon as threatened, reversing a 2004 decision
to list the species as threatened under the ESA. 96 Though the decision to
list the coho salmon had been primarily justified by the agency's biological
review team's fifty-six percent majority position that the coho salmon was
"likely to become endangered," 97 a study conducted by the state of Oregon
persuaded at least the political leadership in the agency98 to abandon the
earlier listing decision. 99 In vacating NMFS's decision to delist the coho
salmon, the district court again drew heavily on evidence of internal
disagreement about the proper course of action. In the process of decisionmaking, "Oregon's Final Assessment was criticized by the NMFS staff
review, which noted that the 'generally poor condition of habitat and water
quality calls into question conclusions that habitat limiting factors have
been sufficiently addressed for the fish to survive future downturns in
ocean survival."' 100 The court also noted that the "Darm Memorandum
rejected the NMFS staff review, which refuted Oregon's conclusion."' 0'
The court was clearly troubled by the evidence that the agency had ignored
its own scientists and "artificially creat[ed] competing inferences from the
scientific evidence." 0 2
2. New Source Review Litigation
New Source Review (NSR) is the Clean Air Act program that requires
existing stationary sources of air pollution to acquire a permit for

96 Endangered and Threatened Species: Withdrawal of Proposals to List and
Designate Critical
Habitat for the Oregon Coast Evolutionarily Significant Unit (ESU) of Coho Salmon, 71 Fed. Reg.
3033-01 (Jan. 19, 2006).
9 Trout Unlimited v. Lohn, 645 F. Supp. 2d 929, 937 (D. Or. 2007).
98 Id. at 943-44 (noting that the Assistant Regional Administrator for Protected Resources for the
region affected sent a memorandum to NMFS arguing that, "[g]iven the competing reasonable
inferences [of the majority of BRT votes and the final Oregon Assessment], we cannot conclude that
the ESU is likely to become endangered").
'9 Endangered and Threatened Species, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3033-01.
0 Trout Unlimited, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 961.

'o' Id. at 963.
10'

Id. at 964-65.
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modifications to the existing facilities.10 3 Depending on where a source is
located, permit applicants must comply with stringent technological and
emission standards. 10 4 In the EPA's decision whether a permit is needed,
the key question the agency must answer is how to understand the term
modification, which is defined in Section 111 of the Clean Air Act as "any
physical change in, or change in the method of operation of, a stationary
source which increases the amount of any air pollutant emitted by such
source or which results in the emission of any air pollutant not previously
emitted."10 5 The agency adopted regulations in 1980 to help expound the
opaque statutory language and limit the potential scope of the permitting
requirement.106 But even the regulations' exemptions-in particular, the
routine maintenance exemption-were designed to be narrow. In
Wisconsin Electric Power Co. v. Reilly, the Seventh Circuit upheld EPA's
exclusion of a "life extension project" on a Wisconsin power plant from
the routine maintenance, repair, and replacement exemption to NSR.ov
The NSR program remained in essentially this posture until the waning
months of the Clinton administration. Tipped off by complaints, the EPA
stepped up enforcement against plants that were going well beyond routine
maintenance without going through the permitting process. 0 s This
reinvigorated effort at enforcement ultimately led to several high-profile
victories against power plants. Then, in 2001, the EPA's practice again
changed abruptly. When the Bush administration took the reins, the NSR
became an immediate target of deregulatory reform 09-a move that
engendered years of litigation.
For the purposes of this article, the focus is on the ways in which EPA
career staff, both in the Air Program and in the Office of General Counsel,
balked at efforts to fundamentally change the NSR program and stop the
Clinton-era enforcement actions in their tracks. It now seems clear that
career staff in the EPA were thinking strategically well before the specific
NSR rules. Professor Joel Mintz noted, as the eventual challenges to the
NSR were pending in the D.C. Circuit, "Regrettably for all concerned, the
first contacts between EPA's career enforcement staff and the Agency's
103

§ 7502(c)(5) (2006).
§§ 7475(a)(4), 7503(a)(2)
U.S.C. § 7411 (2006).
C.F.R. § 52.24(f)(6)(i) (1980).

42 U.S.C.

" 42 U.S.C.

10542

'0640

(2006).

107Wisconsin

Electric Power Co. v. Reilly, 893 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1990) (as amended on denial of
rehearing en banc Apr. 3, 1990).
1 See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners at 9, New York v. EPA, 443 F.3d 880 (D.D.C. 2006) (No. 031380), 2006 WL 123108.
" See NAT'L ENERGY POLICY DEv. GROUP, NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY REPORT: RELIABLE,
AFFORDABLE, AND ENVIRONMENTALLY SOUND ENERGY FOR AMERICA'S FUTURE (2001).
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new top managers did not go well. Instead, some of the staff saw in those
early meetings and actions a harbinger of an era in which federal
enforcement of environmental laws would be given short shrift."' 10
Before any formal announcement of the proposal emerged, internal
documents highlighting internal criticism of the proposed changes were
anonymously leaked to NRDC and then forwarded by NRDC to media
outlets. As NRDC attorney John Walke (a former EPA attorney himself)
noted, the "documents [were] fairly damning indictments of what the Bush
administration want[ed] to do to the Clean Air Act," indicating that "the
party that gave them to [NRDC] was obviously concerned about that kind
of outcome."'
Some documents from January 2002 showed EPA
officials, including EPA administrator Christine Whitman, opposing plans
emerging from Vice President Richard Cheney's Energy Taskforce and the
Department of Energy.11 2 Other documents highlighted an internal debate
between political appointees in the EPA's Office of Air and Radiation and
career staff in the EPA's Office of General Counsel. Agency attorneys in
the Office of General Counsel called the proposed changes "legally
vulnerable," but the official position of the EPA was that any changes had
not been finalized yet.1 13 On the heels of these high-profile leaks, one
senior EPA official, Eric Schaeffer, the Director of the EPA's Office of
Regulatory Enforcement, resigned in highly public fashion, writing in his
letter to EPA Administrator Whitman that he had "never seen that kind of
political pressure applied to an enforcement issue."ll4
After this highly publicized leak and resignation, attention to the NSR
issue spiked, 15 and both environmentalists and industry groups were
highly vocal in the EPA's nationwide public hearings on proposed NSR
changes.1 16 When the Bush administration finally acted on its NSR plans, it
was clear that career staff were not bluffing. The administration ultimately
"o Joel A. Mintz, "Treading Water": A Preliminary Assessment of EPA Enforcement During the
Bush

II Administration, 34

ENvTL.

L.

REP.

(Envtl.

Law

Inst.)

10933,

10935

(2004),

http://www.environmentalintegrity.org/pdf/publications/ERL Article.pdf.
.. Neela Banerjee, Files Detail Debate in E.P.A. on Clean Air, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2002,
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/21/us/files-detail-debate-in-epa-on-clean-air.html.
112Id. See also Mintz, supra note
I10.
113 Banerjee, supra note
I11.
114 Tony Freemantle, EPA Official Quits, Criticizes
White House on Air-Pollution Regulations,
Hous. CHRON. (March 1, 2002), available at 2002 WLNR 9010399. Schaeffer immediately cofounded an interest group called the "Environmental Integrity Project," which sought to combine
"policy analysis, media outreach and litigation to advocate for more effective enforcement of
environmental laws." Environmental Integrity Project Staff Environmental Integrity Project, (Nov. 2 1,
2011), http://www.environmentalintegrity.org/abouteip/abouteip-staff.php
115For a sampling, see the sources collected in Mintz, supra note 110, at 10940 n.4.
"16EmissionsPolarizeBusiness, Environment, WASTE NEWS, Apr. 14, 2003,
at 10.
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promulgated two NSR rules, one primarily establishing a new framework
for evaluating baselines for estimating emissions and the other modifying
the routine maintenance, repair, and replacement exemption to exempt
projects that cost twenty percent or less of the replacement value of the
unit being maintained, repaired, or replaced, even if they result in a
significant net increase in emissions.' 17 In the case of the routine
maintenance, repair, and replacement "twenty percent" rule, the effect of
the rule was to immediately withdraw authority in most of the EPA's
ongoing enforcement actions against electric power plants' 18 and to allow
projected increased emissions well in excess of the de minimis increases
that the EPA had traditionally allowed.1 19
NRDC and other groups spared no time in developing a comprehensive
litigation strategy to challenge the EPA's NSR revisions, 120 and, in doing
so, they made explicit use of the evidence of the political manipulation
provided to them in the early stages of the NSR saga. In New York II, the
consolidated brief of the environmental petitioners drew heavily on a 2004
report issued by the EPA's Office of Inspector General (OIG). 12 1 The
report discussed the division that developed between EPA's Office of Air
Regulation (OAR), which drafted the NSR 20-percent rule, and the Office
of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance (OECA), which opposed the
rule, and suggested that EPA reconsider the basis for the rule and seek
greater cooperation with OECA. 122 Altogether, the OIG report built a
substantial case of political manipulation, noting the thin basis for the
twenty percent rule, the OECA career staff's suggestion of a 0.75-percent
rule,123 and the OECA's opinion that the 20-percent rule would "eviscerate
the air enforcement program."1 2 4 Further indicating the extent of the rift,
117Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Grandfatheringand Environmental Regulation: The
Law and Economics ofNew Source Review, 101 Nw. U. L. REv. 1677, 1696-1705 (2007).
"1 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 108, at 14.
'ld. at 15.
120Bruce Geiselman, Council Warns of Additional NSR Lawsuit: Indiana,Ohio or Louisiana May
Face Court Date with Groups Over Air Regulation Reform, WASTE NEWS, July 5, 2004, at 16 (noting
that the NRDC supported two suits challenging NSR rule changes and planned to file suit to challenge
states' implementation of NSR reforms).
121Brief for Petitioners, supra note 108, at 16-18.
122 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, REP. No. 2004-P-00034,
EVALUATION REPORT: NEW SOURCE REVIEW RULE CHANGE HARMS EPA'S ABILITY TO ENFORCE
AGAINST COAL-FIRED ELECTRIC UTILITIES (2004) available at http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2004/

20040930-2004-P-00034.pdflhereinafter OIG REPORT].
123 The memorandum in which the career staff had suggested the 0.75 percent number, in addition
to being a primary point of emphasis in the OIG report, was itself leaked to the press by a former
official "critical of the administration" while controversy raged on. Bruce Barcott, ChangingAll the
Rules, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 4, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/04/magazine/04BUSH.html.
124OIG REPORT, supra note 122, at 11.
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the OIG report noted that the new heads of the OECA supported the rule,
but that the OIG based its findings largely on comments by career staff in

the OECA. 12 5
The OIG report was itself something of a controversial confrontation
with the Bush administration, as the OIG had to defend its use of much of
the information-in particular, its use of a 2002 memorandum between
OECA and OAR-against claims by the administration that the
information was part of the deliberative process of the agency and should
be withheld from the public. 12 6 The environmental petitioners also noted
evidence that the head of EPA's enforcement office during the
promulgation of the NSR rules had disagreed with the administration and
concluded that the administration had pushed through a rule that did not
"pass the laugh test."1 27
While the D.C. Circuit did not specifically cite any of the evidence of
dissensus in its decision vacating the 20-percent rule, it would be difficult
to maintain that the court was not influenced by it. The NSR saga is the
prototype for litigation-fostered bureaucratic autonomy. Career staff,
sensing that their programs were on the chopping block, used a variety of
mechanisms-leaks to interest groups, interviews with media, complaints
to the OIG-to highlight dissensus and signal interested actors that
litigation was possible. This informal campaign was started early enough
that litigants had almost four years to prepare a narrative. These outside
actors followed through, incorporating the story of political manipulation
and dissensus directly into their merits briefs. 128 If there is one thing to take
away from the NSR saga, it is that agency career staff and litigants outside
the agency were able to effectively paint the entire NSR program revision
as inherently arbitrary and unsupported by much of the agency itself by
providing the court with an avenue to vacatur of the 20-percent rule.

125Id. at 8 n.7.
126Id. at 44 ("The

report also makes much of a June 2002 memo from OECA to OAR. This memo
is a deliberative agency document that should not be disclosed in this report. In any event, the report
mischaracterizes its content. The report also implies in several places that the rule was not developed
using an 'open, public, and transparent' process, which is simply not the case. These major errors
create a vastly different picture of the ERP rulemaking process than the one that actually occurred, and
must be corrected.").
27Brief for Petitioners, supra note 108, at 18 (citing Mintz, supranote 110, at 10939).
128See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 108, at 16-17.
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C. Synthesizing Litigation-FosteredBureaucraticAutonomy: The Idea of
Dissonance
The case studies collected here offer a core insight: "losing"
constituencies within an agency are not completely out of luck when
political officials push through a final rule that departs from the
preferences of those constituencies. Though the case studies do not exhaust
the potential catalogue of strategic agency behaviors,12 9 they nevertheless
strongly suggest that bureaucratic agents possess both the incentives and
the wherewithal to press their policy preferences in a variety of legal fora,
and, most importantly, ultimately in judicial review of agency rulemaking.
Of course, some of the dynamics of resistance outlined in the case studies
presuppose a symbiotic partner-perhaps the media, interest groups,
watchdog groups, or oversight institutions within agencies-and therefore
might not be true self-governance. As Part III makes clear, it is less
important to bicker about the semantics of autonomy than it is to
understand that the phenomenon presents a challenge to dominant
understandings of administrative law and conventional accounts of the
legitimacy of the administrative state.
It is worth taking some time to theorize about the common features of
the mechanisms of litigation-fostered bureaucratic autonomy. One place to
look for a theoretical framework is in a theory of reputational power and
networks. Looking to the history of American political development,
Professor Carpenter argues that autonomous agencies-i.e., agencies that
are able to "take actions consistent with their own wishes" even when
politicians and other organized interests "would prefer that other actions
(or no action at all) be taken" 30-emerge
when agencies have
organizational reputations based on talent, cohesion, and efficiency and are
able to "marshal the varied forces of American politics into coalitions,
coalitions that are unique and irreducible to lines of party, class, or
parochial interest."1 31 Focusing on reputational power
allows for strategic regulatory officials who respond to
incentives of a kind. It allows for the possibility and
narration of dysfunction and systematic regulatory error
(including too much responsiveness to regulated industry,
129 This Article only purports to explore the strategic use of dissent in litigation.
Much has been
written about dissent and resistance in agencies generally, see supra Part IA, but the role of
administrative law in supporting such dissent and resistance is not well understood.
130CARPENTER, supra note 23, at 4.

"' Id. at 4-5.

JournalofLaw and Politics

154

[Vol.XXVIII: 129

as well as too much cautiousness). It allows for prediction
of systematic regulatory successes, including pursuit of the
public interest. It can incorporate differences within a
regulatory organization, and it can incorporate the
multiplicity of constituencies and networks that suffuse
regulatory politics. It can bring both flexibility and
intellectual order to the study of regulation as it is
performed by the various organizations of state.132
We might understand litigation-fostered bureaucratic autonomy as one
manifestation of reputational power and networking of this sort. What is
central in this account is an agency staffs cashing in on the reputational
and network capital of the agency by reaching out to its symbiotic partners
in the press, interest groups, the public, and, ultimately, the courts and by
appealing to its claim to represent competence or expertise on a matter. But
Carpenter does not disaggregate agencies along the political/professional
axis, and instead treats agencies as generally cohesive organizations. Thus,
Carpenter does not clearly speak to the effect of division within an agency;
his concern is with the ways that a relatively cohesive agency (including
political appointees) can resist the political imperatives of the White House
by hamessing reputational power.
In some ways, and in contrast with Carpenter's study of the use of
reputation and expertise to promote autonomy, the specific mechanism that
emerges from the case studies in Part I.B involves the deliberate
destruction of an agency's reputation insofar as career staff attempt to
build a record of internal inconsistency and myopia in the institution in
order to resist the imperatives of both the President and his loyal political
appointees. In other words, Carpenter's account of reputational power
seems most on point in an agency environment not plagued by
politicization and division, but at least since the 1970s, Congress and
especially presidents have been much more proactive about controlling
political appointees as part of a strategy of reining in administrative
agencies. 133 If the dominant story of the last forty years is about division
and efforts to control that division, then the idea of reputational power as a

132 DANIEL

CARPENTER,

REPUTATION

AND

POWER:

PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT THE FDA 70 (2010).
1' See Shapiro & Wright, supra note 35, at 577 ("The

ORGANIZATIONAL

IMAGE

AND

administrative presidency seeks to rein in
bureaucratic discretion by centralizing decision-making in the White House and by sending vast
numbers of political appointees into the agencies to monitor and control the bureaucrats.").
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means of bureaucratic autonomy (at least insofar as it relies on an agency
acting as a relatively cohesive unit) is seemingly incomplete.
A more appropriate metaphor for the specific dynamics of litigationfostered bureaucratic autonomy is the idea of dissonance. Judges are used
to approaching concepts like "reasonableness" and "non-arbitrariness" in
the way one approaches a piece of music. While in any composition there
are undoubtedly manifold parts working relatively independently, the
foundational assumption is that these constituent elements of a
composition come together cohesively. Commonsense notions of
rationality or reasonableness presuppose harmony. Judges rely on this
notion frequently and in a variety of contexts. For instance, while courts do
not consider mere evidence of conflict between an agency's final action
and internal, preliminary opinions to be inconsistent with healthy
deliberation,1 3 4 they do nevertheless factor in this difference when
considering whether the agency "considered the relevant factors and
articulated a rational connection between the facts found and the choices
made."13' Likewise, it is black letter administrative law that, at least when
a court applies Skidmore deference, an agency interpretation of law that
modifies a previous interpretation is entitled to less deference than a
completely new interpretation. 136 Finally, courts can properly find agency
action unreasonable if it apparently ignores the opinions of other agencies
with expertise in the matter.137 These standards are difficult to justify under
a reasonableness standard that is inattentive to harmony; they are much
easier to understand if they show that part of what courts are looking for in
evaluating "reasonable" agency action is evidence that the action is
internally and temporally consistent.
Moreover, in the context of the ESA, at least, a whole line of cases has
found agency action arbitrary when there was clear evidence that the
agency ignored evidence of differing opinion within the agency.' 38 In Trout
134 Nw. Ecosystem Alliance v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 475 F.3d 1136, 1145 (9th Cir. 2007)
(noting that an agency "may change its mind after internal deliberation").
' id., citing Nat'l Assoc. of Home Builders v. Norton, 340 F.3d 835, 841 (9th Cir. 2003).
136United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001) (citing Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134,
139-40 (1944)). Originally, this consistency principle in administrative law arguably applied across the
board. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 n.30 (1987). However, the Court has recently
narrowed that position, at least with respect to exercises of agency policy-making discretion. See FCC
v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 514 (2009); but see id.at 505 (noting that even if change
is not per se impermissible, an agency must at least openly acknowledge it is changing and not merely
operate "sub silentio").
137See Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 701 F.2d 1011, 1030 (2d Cir. 1983).
13 See, e.g., In re Consol. Salmonid Cases, 791 F. Supp. 2d 802, 823 (E.D. Cal. 2011) ("A court
should 'reject conclusory assertions of agency "expertise" where the agency spurns unrebutted expert
opinions without itself offering a credible alternative explanation."'); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v.
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Unlimited v. Lohn, the district court faced a record that was strikingly
divided-the review team had split nearly fifty-fifty on the propriety of
listing the coho salmon as a threatened speciesl 39-- but the court
nevertheless found the agency's decision arbitrary and capricious, focusing
on NMFS's failure to give weight to the agency's own staff's narrow
majority position. This is hardly consistent with a stripped-down notion of
reasonableness, for in this case, it appears to be perfectly reasonable to go
either way. Instead, these standards and cases are clear evidence that courts
are, at least occasionally, attentive to something like "harmony" in
arbitrary and capricious review.
To be sure, judges know that the issues they confront in any regulatory
policy are likely to be complex, but they nevertheless must assume that a
reasonable and non-arbitrary decision is one that manages to attain some
level of internal consistency, coherence, and discipline. Just as one or two
dissonant notes can ruin a musical composition,14 0 one or two dissonant
notes can shatter the image of reasonableness on which a regulatory
policy's legitimacy under the Administrative Procedure Act hinges. 141
II. LACK OF DETERRENT PRESSURE
One reason to doubt that litigation-fostered bureaucratic autonomy is a
widespread phenomenon is the possibility that sufficient deterrents exist to
discourage career staff from active resistance. For instance, career staff,
though at least on paper protected by civil service laws entitling them to
Lohn, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1239 (W.D. Wash. 2003) ("A court must defer to an agency's expertise.
However, such deference is warranted only when the agency utilizes, rather than ignores, the analysis
of its experts." (citing N. Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479, 483 (W.D. Wash. 1988)), vacated,
511 F.3d 960 (9th Cir. 2007); Am. Wildlands v. Norton, 193 F. Supp. 2d 244, 253, 257 (D.D.C. 2002);
Friends of the Wild Swan, Inc. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv.,12 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1135 (D. Or. 1997);
Defenders of Wildlife v. Babbitt, 958 F. Supp. 670, 683-85 (D.D.C. 1997); Res. Ltd., Inc. v. Robertson,
35 F.3d 1300, 1305 (9th Cir. 1993).
1
Trout Unlimited v. Lohn, 645 F. Supp. 2d 929, 937 (D. Or. 2007). See supra note 97 and
accompanying text.
140 Of course, dissonance might make a musical composition more compelling. I must assume that
judges do not enjoy dissonance in the administrative state the same way they might occasionally enjoy
dissonance in a classical composition. In most cases, the analogy makes sense.
141 It is important to note that this dissonance need not depend on the assumption that career staff
represent greater "expertise." Recent scholarship has argued that the current Supreme Court seems to
be reinvigorating an expertise-based strand of doctrine in such cases as Massachusetts v. EPA. See
Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 41. Though much of the evidence reviewed in this paper happens to
involve scientists, the theory suggested here ultimately does not depend on ideas of expertise, but rather
on the idea that evidence of dissonance (without regard to relative expertise of any one position) affects
judicial review. This theory is thus distinct from the theory of resurgence of expertise offered by
Professors Freeman and Vermeule.
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some procedure in the case of retaliatory termination, are still subject to
dismissal for insubordination, poor performance, or any other conduct
amounting to "cause."l 42 Moreover, throughout most of the history of
whistleblower protection, paper rights have been difficult to translate into
practice.14 3 Whistleblower protections are undoubtedly less robust than
they were in a pre-Garcettiv. Ceballosl44 world,145 and countless scholars
have criticized the agencies responsible for policing compliance with civil
service laws-the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) and the Merit Systems
Protection Board (MSPB)-for their general ineffectiveness.146 Adverse
employment actions taken in response to whistleblowing (such as
diminution of responsibility or transfer to less desirable units or projects)
are certainly not unheard of, and most probably go unaddressed. More
seriously, career staff may subject themselves to criminal liability by
releasing information in some circumstances involving confidential
national security documents.
While it is worthwhile to consider some of these prophylactic limits on
the litigation-fostered bureaucratic autonomy, I argue that these deterrent
pressures are not enough to control the behavior of career staff. The law
surrounding dissent in agencies, as some have noted, reflects a "love-hate"
relationship.147 For one thing, the Code of Ethics for Government Service
can be read to not only permit some dissent but also impose a duty to
dissent in certain circumstances.148 Moreover, President Obama's 2009
memorandum on "scientific integrity" in administrative agencies directed
the White House's Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) to
142 5 C.F.R. § 752.301 (2003); Mendelson, supra note 10, at 615
("[T]rue subversion probably
would constitute sufficient cause to fire a civil servant.").
143Thomas M. Devine, The Whistleblower ProtectionAct of 1989: Foundation
for the Modern Law

ofEmployment Dissent, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 531, 535 (1999).
44 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (holding that the First Amendment does not insulate
public employees from employer discipline when employees make statements pursuant to official
duties).
145See Orly Lobel, Citizenship, Organizational Citizenship, and the Laws of Overlapping
Obligations,97 CALIF. L. REv. 433, 433 (2009) (noting that "Garcetti exemplifies a distorted meeting
of citizenship and organizational citizenship, driving a wedge between actions of the individual as
citizen and as an employee").
146 Devine, supra note 143, at 534 (noting that "for extended periods [OSC's] approach [to
whistleblower claims] ranged from neglect to overt hostility" and that results were only "marginally
better" in the MSPB). But see id at 573 (noting that the MSPB has become a much more favorable
forum for whistleblower complainants since 1996).
147Id. at 553; see also Lobel, supra note 145, at 434 (describing a "deep ambivalence within
judicial and statutory doctrines about the role of individuals in resisting illegality in their group
settings," and noting that at times we call government informers "patriotic" and at other times
"snitches" and "rats").
148See, e.g., 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101 (1997) ("Public service is a public trust, requiring employees to
place loyalty to the Constitution, the laws and ethical principles above private gain.").
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develop recommendations for the drafting of "appropriate rules and
procedures to ensure the integrity of the scientific process," to create
"procedures to identify and address instances in which the scientific
process or the integrity of scientific and technological information may be
compromised," and to "adopt such additional procedures, including any
appropriate whistleblower protections, as are necessary to ensure the
integrity of scientific and technological information and processes on
which the agency relies in its decision making or otherwise uses or
prepares."1 49 Though OSTP is still reviewing agencies' proposed
implementation of these reform policies nearly three years after the Obama
memorandum, and though some agencies' proposed implementing policies
have come under attack for failing to fully implement protections,150 the
formal stance of the Obama administration in support of scientific integrity
indicates that the politics of retaliation are tricky, thus giving agency
dissenters plenty of moral, if not legal, support.
A. InternalDisclosureofPoliticalManipulation
As demonstrated by the examples in Part I, career staff actually have a
variety of protected internal avenues to voice their dissent.' 5 ' Featured
most prominently in the case studies above are the agencies' offices of
inspector general, or something similar. These offices are billed as
independent watchdogs, and that is typically how they function. Formally,
they have no power to alter the agency's decision, but to focus on this
feature of the offices is to ignore the critical role that they can play in
amplifying dissent for later use in litigation. Because participation in
investigations run by offices of inspector general is typically anonymous,
disclosing dissent through these officers is a low-cost, low-risk way for
career staff to vocalize their concerns. Moreover, once things are set in
motion by a formal request for investigation, a snowball effect can take
place as the investigation lends legitimacy to and lowers the barriers for
those who have complaints about the administration. Similarly, the
149 Memorandum of President Barack Obama for the Heads of Exec. Dep'ts and Agencies (Mar. 9,
2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/memorandum-heads-executivedepartments-and-agencies-3-9-09.
iso See, e.g., Press Release, Union of Concerned Scientists, Interior Department's New Scientific
Integrity Policy Must Trigger Significant Changes To Be Effective (Feb. 1, 2011),
http://www.ucsusa.org/news/press-release/interior-departments-new-SI-policy-0495.html.
1' Devine, supra note 143, at 552-53 (noting that Congress in 1989 amended the Civil Service
Reform Act to increase protected disclosures beyond conventional "whistleblowing" to more informal
means of dissent, including "complaints or grievances, testimony or assistance to anyone else
exercising appeal rights, cooperating with or disclosing information to the Special Counsel or an
Inspector General, or 'for refusing to obey an order that would require an individual to violate a law').
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commencement of a formal investigation can put political appointees on
their heels; rather than stifling an investigation or retaliating against
complainants, political appointees will be forced to minimize the damage
by disclaiming the office's investigation on the merits. This may be too
little, too late for the political appointees, as the mere existence of the
office's report will nevertheless strongly suggest a fractured agency.
A less categorically acceptable method of internal dissent is
whistleblowing. Whistleblower protections for federal employees are
codified in the Civil Service Reform Actl 52 and, at least theoretically,
afford a remedy whenever there is a "prohibited personnel practice." 53 The
Act specifies several categories of protected disclosures 5 4 and allows
federal employees who are the subject of retaliatory action for a protected
disclosure to bring a claim before the Merit Systems Protection Board
(MSPB).'ss Early iterations of the CSRA were widely criticized as
ineffectual, 5 6 and Congress consequently revisited the law twice (in 1989
and 1994). By 1999, it appeared that Congress' efforts were paying some
dividends, largely because of newly formed laws which made it so that,
"[fjor the first time, agency bullies realistically may have something to lose
by doing the dirty work of retaliation." 5 7
Though there was still work to be done,' 5 8 the 1989 and 1994 revisions
clearly set whistleblower protection on a positive trajectory. The MSPB
has collected longitudinal survey data from 1992 through 2010 on the
perception of retaliation among those who engaged in a statutorily
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, §101, 92 Stat. I111 (1978); id. at 553.
"' 5 U.S.C. §2302 (2006).
154Of particular interest here are three such protected activities. First, there can be no personnel
action because of "any disclosure of information by an employee or applicant which the employee or
applicant reasonably believes evidences . . . a violation of any law, rule, or regulation," or which
evidences "gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and
specific danger to public health or safety." 5 U.S.C. §2302(b)(8)(A). Second, there can be no personnel
action relating to "any disclosure to the Special Counsel, or to the Inspector General of an agency or
another employee designated by the head of the agency to receive such disclosures" of evidence
suggesting violation of the laws or gross mismanagement, etc. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(B). Third, there
can be no personnel action "for refusing to obey an order that would require the individual to violate a
law." 5 U.S.C. §2302(b)(9)(D). All of the protected activities can be found at 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b). See
152

generally U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYEES

at
http://www.mspb.gov/netsearch/viewdocs.aspx?docnumber-557972&
available
(2010),
version=559604&application=ACROBAT [hereinafter, WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS].
"' See 5 U.S.C. § 1221(a) (1994); Devine, supra note 143, at 541 ("The opportunity to nip
harassment in the bud is highly significant. Through a hearing to challenge the first tangible
manifestations of the reprisal cycle, a whistleblower can shrink the drawn out struggle for career
survival by an earlier litigation victory.").
56 Devine, supra note 143, at 535.
57 Id. at 566.
iS Id.
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protected activity such as disclosing an unlawful order. These statistics
indicate across-the-board decreases in the rate of perception of
retaliation-from 8.3% in 1992 to 3.2% in 2010.159 Part of this is driven by
the fact that when employees do make a disclosure, they are more able to
protect their anonymity than at any time before: Only 42.5% of
respondents in 2010 believed they had been identified through the
disclosure, as compared to 53.1% in 1992.160 Respondents in 2010 were
much more likely to take some kind of action in response to perceived
problems than they were to do so in 1992; the number of respondents
saying they took no action fell from 45.2% to 26.4%.161 However, the
respondents in 2010 did indicate much greater perceptions of threatened
and actual retaliation as well. 162 As the report concludes, agency employees
seem to be much more knowledgeable about their rights and more capable
of exercising them than they were in the past. 16 3
For the most part, whistleblower protections are designed for much
more serious situations (e.g., when an agency employee engages in illegal
or fraudulent activities) than those presented by mere disagreement about
the requirements of law or by manipulation of a career staff's work by
political appointees. Nevertheless, the improvement in protection over the
years reflects some increasing level of societal approval of dissent in
agencies and may very well encourage whistleblowing.
B. External Disclosure
A more extreme, subversive, and extra-legal (though potentially less
dangerous) avenue of dissent is to simply bypass offices of inspector
general or whistleblowing within an agency and to instead voice
complaints outside the agency, perhaps to interest groups or the media.
Part of the formal whistleblower protection law is a requirement that
disclosure of prohibited activities be made to specific parties within the

' U.s. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., PROHIBITED PERSONNEL PRACTICES: EMPLOYEE PERCEPTIONS 33
& tbl. 7 (2011), available at http://www.mspb.gov/netsearch/viewdocs.aspx?docnumber-634680

&version=636592&application=ACROBAT.
'6 Id. at 32.
161 U.S. MERIT SYs. PROT. BD., BLOWING THE WHISTLE: BARRIERS TO FEDERAL EMPLOYEES
MAKING DISCLOSURES 13 & tbl.8 (2011), available at http://www.mspb.gov/netsearch/

viewdocs.aspx?docnumber-662503&version=664475&application=ACROBAT.
162Id. at 12 & tbl.7 ("[P]erceived denials of promotions, opportunities for training, transfers to a
new location, suspensions, and demotions all more than doubled in both threats and experienced
actions.").
163See id. at 14.
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T 6 so at least on the face of things, external avenues of dissent
government,'
seem sub-optimal. In essence, the disgruntled civil servant who decides to
go outside the agency usually foregoes all protections that might otherwise

apply.165
Despite this gamble, it appears that external disclosure is a viable
option. The news is replete with reports of leaked documents and
information. Several high-profile national security leaks during the George
W. Bush administration led the administration to initiate what some
believed to be the most aggressive effort since the Nixon administration to
crack down on the persistent problem of leaks.' 66 Nevertheless, the effort
consisted mostly of efforts to control the demand side of leaking
arrangements-i.e., those in the media-by threatening prosecution under
the Espionage Act.' 6 1 While this effort might have had some temporary
chilling effect on the practice of leaking (especially in cases of leaks by
national security agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency or the
State Department, where cases prosecuting leaks of classified information
are sometimes brought16 8 ), the sheer volume of evidence of leaking
suggests that both career staff and external actors engage in the practice
with impunity. In many cases, there is not even an effort to truly conceal
the identity of the leaker.
During the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations, the watchdog
group Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility (PEER),
regularly published "white papers" that were actually written by
anonymous employees within agencies and criticized the management of
" WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTIONS, supra note 154, at 17 ("If the report was made to an 'incorrect'
party, it will prevent the potential whistleblower from being protected. If the report was made to a
'correct' party, then the potential whistleblower may or may not be protected, depending upon other
factors."). A disclosure is generally not protected if it is made to the wrongdoer or if it violates a law
(including regulations) or Executive Orders. Id. at 18-21. Of crucial importance, however, a disclosure
to the media is not always prohibited: "[1]n some cases, the disclosure is protected only if it is made to
the agency's Inspector General, to another employee designated by the head of the agency to receive
such disclosures, or to the Office of the Special Counsel. In other cases, however, a disclosure to a
different party, such as the media, would still be protected." Id. at 20.
6' However, the MSPB has indicated that it will only exempt such communications to the media
from Whistleblower Protection Act protection if the communication was in violation of a specific
regulation tethered to an "explicit Congressional mandate . . . to prohibit such disclosures." See
MacLean v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 2011 M.S.P.B. 70, 1 17 (2011). The MSPB thus seems to be
rather hesitant about excluding whistleblower protection on the basis of communication to the media.
166Dan Eggen, White House Trains Efforts on Media Leaks, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 2006,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/04/AR2006030400867.html.
167Id. Of course, this crackdown, even in theory, only affected national security-related leaks.
6 Michael Isikoff, 'Double Standard' in White House Leak Inquiries?, MSNBC, Oct. 18, 2010,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/39693850/ns/us-news-security/t/double-standard-white-house-leakinquiries/#.Tr6Slkeo3eU; Jane Mayer, The Secret Sharer: Is Thomas Drake an Enemy of the State?,
NEW YORKER, May 23, 2011, http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/05/23/110523fafactmayer.
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those agencies. For example, PEER released a 2005 report by scientists in
the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) charging that BLM was
responsible for "gross mismanagement" of public lands under its charge. 16 9
The scientists claimed that the agency had systematically allowed
overgrazing on these lands and that a proposed program for grazing fee
incentives (under which the agency would waive up to 75% of grazing fees
in exchange for "good rangeland practices") was misguided and impossible
for the agency to manage.1 70 In releasing the report, PEER noted that the
report "was painstakingly prepared by over a dozen current [BLM]
employees in the inter-mountain west," including "district managers,
fisheries and wildlife biologists, and range conservationists," and had been
"peer reviewed by over thirty other grazing specialists and scientists in
other federal and state land management agencies, academia, and other
knowledgeable people in the private sector."1 71 PEER also noted that the
authors "have had to stay anonymous, in order to avoid the inevitable
retaliation that would be taken against them."1 7 2 While these employees
were clearly reticent to completely reveal their identities, it seems difficult
to believe that BLM could not have discovered the identities of the authors
with some investigative effort. All of this suggests that political appointees
lack the institutional capacity or perhaps even the political capital to
discover and control methods of external disclosure.
Formal agency policies on communication with outside parties vary
widely. Many agencies routinely send memoranda reminding agency staff
that they are not to release intra- and inter-agency memoranda,
policymaking documents, draft rules and Federal Register documents, and
legal opinions. 17 3 However, the Food and Drug Administration's effort to
minimize criticism of one such memo by referring to it as simply a
"prudent reminder" of some of the agency's responsibilities 7 4 suggests
that these methods are rather toothless. In sharp contrast, as part of the
Obama administration's scientific integrity policy reforms, the National
Science Foundation (NSF) has proposed a right of NSF employees and
funded researchers to
169 PUBLIC

EMPLOYEES

FOR

ENVIRONMENTAL

RESPONSIBILITY, PUBLIC

TRUST

BETRAYED:

EMPLOYEE CRITIQUE OF THE BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT RANGELAND MANAGEMENT, at ii

(2005), availableat http://www.peer.org/pubs/whitepapers/public-trustbetrayed.pdf.
70

Id. at ii, 6-7.
...
Id. at i.

172
Id.
173Alicia Mundy, Memo to FDA Staff Don't Leak This, WALL ST. J. HEALTH BLOG (Mar. 17,
2009, 2:13 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/health/2009/03/17/memo-to-fda-staff-dont-leak-this/.
174Id.
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express their personal views, provided they specify that
they are not speaking on behalf of, or as a representative
of, the agency but rather in their private capacity. So long
as this disclaimer is made, the employee is permitted to
mention his or her institutional affiliation and position if
this has helped inform his or her views on the matter.175
In a study of agency policies and practices regarding communication
with media and the public, the Union of Concerned Scientists found wide
variation in the freedoms of agency staff both across agencies and
sometimes even within agencies.17 6 Even when an agency has policies
against unauthorized communications, such policies do not seem to
effectively deter anonymous leaks. For instance, the EPA and the BLM
ranked among the most repressive on the UCS report card, 177 but as we
have seen in Part II, those agencies have had incidents of anonymous and
highly effective dissenting behavior.
Ultimately, the relatively informal route of disclosing dissent through
external avenues can be extraordinarily useful and appears generally to be
relatively costless because of the lack of a credible threat of discovery or
enforcement, or perhaps because full-fledged enforcement might reveal
information that the agency would rather control. Moreover, at least for
more senior career staff members, the potential consequences of being
discovered may be softened by the promise of employment in the public
interest groups that most frequently work with the agency. 78
III. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS: THE CHALLENGE TO "CONTROL"
MODELS AND THE DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE

If bureaucrats who lose in the policy-making process can use
administrative law instrumentally to move policy away from the
administration's formal policy choice, this reality carries implications for
both the empirical underpinnings of administrative law scholarship and the
7 Implementation of Scientific Integrity Principles: Draft Plan for Public Comment, 76 Fed. Reg.
47,271 (Aug. 4, 2011).
176 UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, FREEDOM TO SPEAK? A REPORT CARD
ON FEDERAL

AGENCY MEDIA POLICIES
Freedom-to-Speak.pdf.
I id.

(2008),

http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/scientific

"7 See, e.g., supra note 114 and accompanying text.

integrity/
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normative justifications of the administrative state. This section represents
an initial excursus on these themes, but more work, both empirical and
normative, will have to be done to completely understand what the concept
of litigation-fostered bureaucratic autonomy and similar accounts of
bureaucratic resistance mean for these literatures and administrative law
writ large.
A. A Challenge to the PoliticalControl Consensus
At root, the phenomenon of litigation-fostered bureaucratic autonomy is
a challenge to conventional notions of the operation of administrative law
in the American constitutional framework. In its simplest form, the
political control model is built on the assumption that "democratic
governance presumes that officials are the servants of the people, and for
that normative proposition to be true, 'the people' must be able to hold
officials accountable for their actions."l 79 Whatever power agencies have,
it is thought, must come from a limited delegation of power by the elected
branches of government, and administrative law helps ensure that agencies
act within the confines of this delegation. While this idea existed in tension
with the expertise-based justifications of the rise of the modem
administrative state in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 80
the idea that delegations of authority must or should ultimately be traceable
to the action of some democratically elected authority has firmly cemented
itself as the leading understanding underpinning administrative law.' 81 Of
course, this simple delegation model is a caricature.1 82 Delegations of
authority are often capacious, and, for at least some, highly problematic in

"7 Jerry L. Mashaw, Bureaucracy, Democracy, and Judicial Review, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY, 569, 569 (Robert F. Durant ed., 2010).
"'o STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL

ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877-1920 (1982) (describing the rise of progressive notions of
expertise as a justification of the expansion of the administrative state).
'8'Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, I J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 81 (1985) (arguing that broad delegation of administrative authority by Congress is
optimal in the sense that it leaves control in the hands of the more politically responsive and
accountable executive branch); Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and
CapriciousReview, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 35 (2009) (noting that the "political control" model has "gained
widespread acceptance").
182For a long time, the legitimizing imagery was the "transmission belt" or "input/output machine"
model, under which agencies simply implement the already well-defined policy decisions of Congress.
JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC
LAW 111 (1997); Stewart, supra note 9, at 1675-76. As Professor Mendelson notes, the transmission
belt model has fallen into disrepute in light of ever-broader statutory delegations of authority, which
leave agencies with considerable policy-making discretion. Mendelson, supra note 10, at 580.
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their breadth 83 - hence, the importance of administrative law, which, in
theory, exists to effectuate political control over agents bestowed with a
delegation of authority.18 4
Ultimately, administrative law may effectuate political control by
tracing a line of authority back to one of two actors: Congress or the
President. The literature of administrative law and political science has
certainly ebbed and flowed in its choice of primary principal. On the
congressional side, a school collectively known as "positive political
theory" posits that Congress in fact exercises primary control over the
administrative state through a variety of mechanisms. The "congressional
dominance" theory starts with the assumption that Congress needs to
delegate authority to administrative agencies because it is institutionally
incapable of micromanaging policymaking and because it must "overcome
collective action, coordination, and social choice instability problems"
resulting especially from the recent growth of partisanship in Congress.185
This principal-agent arrangement creates a potential problem for
political accountability in that an informational asymmetry may develop
between Congress (the principal) and agencies (the agents), leading to a
danger that the agent may exploit the delegation.186 But contrary to some
who argue that this delegation is an entirely unprincipled dump of power to
a completely unaccountable branch of government, 8 positive political
theorists argue that Congress can delegate while still maintaining effective
control over agencies by using a variety of mechanisms. Early models
emphasized an ex post method of control, wherein Congress would use
committee oversight hearings to police agency policy-making. 88 Congress
could rely on "fire alarm" oversight, wherein interested parties with the
time, money, and interest in monitoring agencies in the minutiae of

" See DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: How CONGRESS ABUSES THE
PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1995).

' See Bressman, Beyond Accountability, supra note 9 (arguing that administrative law can and
does simultaneously serve to enhance rationality of decisions and to serve political accountability
purposes).
85Kiewiet & McCubbins, supra note 39, at 232.
86 Mathew McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative
Procedures as
Instruments ofPoliticalControl, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 247 (1987).
187Lowl, supra note 48; SCHOENBROD, supra note 183. For a helpful critique of the
non-delegation
arguments, see Mashaw, supra note 179.
188 JOEL D.

ABERBACH, KEEPING A WATCHFUL EYE: THE POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL

OVERSIGHT (1990); McCubbins, Noll, & Weingast, supra note 186, at 249-51; Mathew McCubbins &
Thomas Schwartz, CongressionalOversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J.
OF POL. SCI. 165, 165-79 (1984).
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policymaking could alert Congress to departures from Congressional
intent.189
Later, positive political theorists refined their theory and shifted their
emphasis to ex ante controls. Under this account, it is more efficient for
Congress to use administrative procedures to ensure that agencies make
acceptable policy in the first place than it is to rely on ex post oversight.1 90
The argument is that by "enfranchising" interested parties in the
administrative policymaking process-e.g., by notice and comment
procedures-Congress essentially "stack[s] the deck" in favor of the
bargained-for policy, preventing any administrative drift.191 Better yet, if
the interested beneficiaries of legislation change their preferences,
administrative procedures allow them to pull the agencies along with
them. 19 2 Hence, Congress achieves control primarily through enhancing the
oversight and control faculties of the concentrated interests that were the
intended beneficiaries of the legislative deal.
While positive political theory has been extraordinarily influential,
administrative law scholars have grown somewhat skeptical of the capacity
of Congress to control administrative action. Some of the more promising
methods of congressional review--e.g., substantive congressional review
of agency rules or methods of congressional oversight-tend to be
"sporadic," "fragmented," and "reactive," leaving the "prospects for indepth and systematic oversight . . . limited."l 93 By and large, the idea of
Congress playing a central role in controlling the administrative state has

189McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 188, at 164-79.
190McCubbins, Noll, & Weingast, supra note 186.

19 Steven J. Balla, Administrative Procedures and Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 92 AM.
POL. Sc. REV. 663, 664 (1998). The "stacking the deck" hypothesis works regardless of whether the
process is generic notice and comment rulemaking or a more specialized consultation procedure (e.g.,
NEPA review or ESA listing petitions) on the assumption that select interests dominate notice and
comment rulemaking. That seems to be the case. See Jason W. Yackee & Susan W. Yackee, A Bias
Towards Business? Assessing Interest Group Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy, 68 J. OF POL. 128
(2006).
192Balla, supra note 191 at 664.
1" Mendelson, supra note 10, at 570; see also BERNARD ROSEN, HOLDING GOVERNMENT
BUREAUCRACIES ACCOUNTABLE 87 (3d ed. 1998) ("Unless [oversight activity] reveals a scandalous
situation, the work is .. .considered dull, with the potential to be troublesome politically."); Thomas 0.
McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process,41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1450 (1992);
Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules: Flexible Regulation and Constraints on Agency Discretion, 51
ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 482 (1999) ("Legislative inertia and the gatekeeping function of congressional
committees can prevent Congress from responding even when there is a general consensus on the need
for legislative action."); Mark Seidenfeld, A Big Picture Approach to PresidentialInfluence on Agency
Policy-Making,80 IOWA L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1994) [hereinafterBig Picture Approach].
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been replaced by a President-centric model of political control. 194 Even so,
administrative law scholars have begun to sense a "turn to Congress" in
administrative law, 195 and have even begun to rediscover some of the
hidden connections between common administrative law doctrines and
congressional control.
Professor Lisa Bressman argues that the Supreme Court has "developed
a law of administrative procedures that is consistent with the [positive
political theory] account."1 96 She points to the "hard look" doctrine,19 7 the
"hybrid rulemaking" requirements imposed by the D.C. Circuit,198 the ban
199
200
on ex parte contacts,199 recent developments
in the Chevron doctrine,
and the liberalization of standing doctrines after the high-water mark of
stingy standing doctrine in Lujan2 0 1 to argue that, on the whole, "[i]t is
possible to view the Court's procedural cases as sensitive to the needs of
Congress for monitoring agency action, while minimizing the potential for
reviewing courts to impose their own views of wise policy." 20 2 In short,
Bressman argues that we can learn a lot about administrative law and its
procedural focus by taking seriously the idea that such procedural rules at
least indirectly help further congressional monitoring of bureaucratic
performance.
Nevertheless, from the 1980s through the 1990s, the President's control
of administrative agencies was the focus of most administrative law
scholarship.2 03 Presidents possess broad discretion in removal of agency
heads, at least in executive agencies, 204 thus allowing for relatively nimble
194See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 10, at 569 ("The relative lack of control by other
branches
would seem to make the President's role more important as a source of legitimacy for the
administrative state."). See also sources cited infra notes 204-213.
1's Jack M. Beermann, The Turn Toward Congress in Administrative Law, 89 B.U. L. REV. 727
(2009).
'96Bressman, Procedures,supra note 8, at 1776.
19 Id. at 1777-83.
'9 Id. at 1783-85. See also Thomas J. Fraser, Interpretive Rules: Can the Amount of Deference
Accorded Them Offer Insight into the ProceduralInquiry?, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1303, 1305 (2010).
199Bressman, Procedures,supra note 9, at 1786-88.
200Id. at 1788-96.

Id. at 1796-1804.
Id. at 1804.
203Mendelson, supra note 10, at 580 ("{Tihe dominant version of the principal-agent approach
to
the democratic legitimacy of administrative agencies is now the presidential control model.").
204Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). But see Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co.
Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3165-66 (2010) (recognizing Myers as overruled in part
and reaffirming that "Congress sometimes may, consistent with the Constitution, limit the President's
authority to remove an officer from his post"); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); Humphrey's
Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). Of course, the President rarely exercises this authority in a
formal sense. Perhaps this is because the threat of removal is sufficient to deter insubordinate action on
2o1
202
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reactions to undesirable regulatory action compared with Congress'
responses, and Presidents have inserted themselves directly in agency
policymaking in a variety of ways.205
The rise of centralized White House regulatory review, in particular,
has raised constitutional eyebrows insofar as it argues for presidential
authority to direct agency heads to implement decisions.207 But nobody can
doubt that, as an empirical matter, centralized review has, in general,
dramatically expanded presidential control over many regulatory
20
Administrative law doctrines articulated by courts followed
programs.208
this shift, at least in part. For instance, the familiar Chevron doctrine
purports to give deference to agencies when they reasonably interpret
ambiguous statutes. 209 Since the formal policy promulgated by an agency
will usually be the product of direction by political appointees, deference
doctrines like Chevron, to the extent that they have any teeth, are
reflections of a growing feature of administrative law to allow room for
presidential management.2 10 Coupled with calls from some scholars urging
yet more direct presidential involvement in the regulatory process, 2 11 all of
the part of agency heads, or perhaps it reflects the success of more nuanced forms of executive control
such as OIRA review.
205 Cass R. Sunstein, Changing Conceptions ofAdministration, 1987 BYU L. REv. 927, 938.
206Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106
COLUM. L. REv. 1260 (2006); Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the
Administrative State: A CriticalLook at the Practice of PresidentialControl, 105 MIcH. L. REv. 47,
55, n.36 (2006).
207See, e.g., Robert V. Percival, Who's in Charge? Does the President Have Directive Authority
over Agency Regulatory Decisions?, 79 FORDHAM L. REv. 2487, 2488 (2011); Peter L. Strauss,
Overseer, or "the Decider"? The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 696
(2007).
208See Percival, supra note 207, at 2533.
209 Chevron U.S.A. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984).
210 Indeed, allowing for more direct presidential control of agency rulemaking was
part of the
Court's motivation in Chevron. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66 (1984) ("Judges are not experts in the
field, and are not part of either political branch of the Government. Courts must, in some cases,
reconcile competing political interests, but not on the basis of the judges' personal policy preferences.
In contrast, an agency to which Congress has delegated policy-making responsibilities may, within the
limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent administration's views of wise policy to
inform its judgments. While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is,
and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such policy choicesresolving the competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or
intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged with the administration of the statute in light of
everyday realities.").
211See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President'sPower to Execute the
Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994) (arguing that the Constitution compels presidential control of the
administrative state); Elena Kagan, PresidentialAdministration, 114 HARv. L. REv. 2245, 2339 (2001)
(lauding the ways that presidents can develop better policy by taking an active role in administration).
But see Percival, supra note 207 (arguing against the historical and textual basis for the President's
authority to issue directives to agency heads); Strauss, supra note 207 (arguing that the constitution
does not require that unitary executive thesis with regard to administration of the regulatory state).
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these reflections of presidential power in the administrative state suggest
that the presidential version of the political control model has been nothing
less than a paradigm shift.2 12
While the debate rages on among those who see administrative law as
furthering political control by one branch or another, there is little
scholarship extending beyond either the congressional or the presidential
version of the political accountability model.213 Yet the existence of
litigation-fostered bureaucratic autonomy may pose descriptive difficulties
for the political control model.
Since positive political theory and studies of presidential control have
largely ignored the career staff and their possible uses of administrative
law and process to resist political control, perhaps the political control
model can simply be adapted to incorporate a more nuanced understanding
of the conflicted nature of administrative law as both an instrument of
control and an instrument of empowerment. This response to litigationfostered bureaucratic autonomy is closely related to the obvious problems
in showing the extensiveness of such subversive dynamics. The argument
is that, even if litigation-fostered bureaucratic autonomy exists, if it exists
at the margins, it does not pose a serious threat to the theoretical integrity
of the political control model and most certainly does not compel a basic
rethinking of our modem notions of what it is that administrative law does.
Instead, litigation-fostered bureaucratic autonomy could simply be
absorbed by the political control model.
While I have no good answer to this concern, given the relatively
inchoate understanding of the extent of the dynamics of litigation-fostered
bureaucratic autonomy and other related (and here unexplored) means of
bureaucratic resistance, the seemingly perfectly developed incentive
structure for such behavior,2 14 coupled with many examples, ought to be
enough to: 1) infer that such behavior may be widespread, and
212 Indeed, it seems that many scholars who would not claim to be presidential control
theorists
have nevertheless acknowledged the theory's empirical validity and its potential contribution to
democratic legitimacy. See, e.g., Seidenfeld, Big Picture Approach, supra note 193, at 12 ("[I]f any
single institution is well suited for monitoring overall government policy, it is the White House.").
213 One semi-successful counter-narrative to the political control model, at least in the last few
years, is the growing expertise model. Some have recently suggested that the current Supreme Court
has indicated some interest in promoting the values of "expertise," as demonstrated by the decisions in
Massachusetts v. EPA and Gonzales v. Oregon. Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 41. Just how
permanent this emphasis on expertise will be is uncertain: Freeman and Vermeule suggest that these
decisions may be temporary responses to evidence of exceptional disregard of expert judgment by the
George W. Bush administration. Id. Overall, the expertise-based understanding of administrative law
has, at least since the 1980s, struggled against the political control model.
214That is, the differentiation of career staff from political officials discussed in Part I combined
with the lack of oversight of means of accessing the litigation process covertly discussed in Part II.
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2) demonstrate the need for those writing in the political control tradition
to broaden their inquiry into the potential limits of the political control
model. In other words, I view this article not as tearing down the political
control model completely, but rather as satisfying a burden of production.
The burden is now on administrative law scholars to take seriously the idea
of career agency staff resistance to political control and begin the task of
uncovering the empirical profile of such behaviors.
If future research confirms the preliminary findings of this article,
however, we should not shy away from directly facing the implications of
broad-based subversive behavior in the administrative state. To the extent
that subversive dynamics are fairly common, they could require significant
revision of the political control model's core assumptions and point the
way to a new research agenda attentive to the conflicted nature of
administrative law and its development. Our understanding of judicially
developed doctrines in administrative law may need to be changed to
accommodate the fact that such doctrines might ultimately reflect tension
between political officials and agency staff. For instance, traditional hard
look review and Chevron review both entail requirements that the agency
have acted reasonably.2 15 While the conventional understanding of these
doctrines centers on the vacillation between expertise (in the case of hard
look review) and politics (in the case of Chevron review),2 16 the former the
province of career staff and the latter the province of political appointees,
litigation-fostered bureaucratic autonomy suggests that these doctrines
actually both reflect an internal consistency principle and give losing
constituencies a substantial bargaining chip in forcing reconciliation of
divisions in policymaking. Attending to this possible understanding of the
function of the "reasonableness" element in both of these doctrines may
217
shed light on several recent developments of these doctrines.
215 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 42-43, (1983)
(articulating the reasonableness standard in hard look review); Chevron, U.S.A. v. NRDC, 467 U.S.
837, 843-44, (1984) (holding that agencies are entitled to reasonable interpretations of ambiguous
statutory provisions).
216 Watts, supra note 181, at 37-38.
217For instance, the Supreme Court has recently done much to limit the application of the Chevron
deference principle. See Daniel J. Gifford, The Emerging Outlines of a Revised Chevron Doctrine:
CongressionalIntent, JudicialJudgment, and Administrative Autonomy, 59 ADMIN. L. REv. 783, 784
(2007) ("Within the last several years, the Court began rewriting the so-called Chevron doctrine in
ways that are not yet fully understood, but whose broad outlines are becoming increasingly clear.").
Though most of that action has not been in so-called Chevron step 2 (i.e., the part of the test that
requires an agency's interpretation of a statute to be reasonable), the Court's growing skepticism of the
broad understanding of deference that Chevron was originally thought to stand for could potentially be
explained in part by the Court's growing awareness that there may not be "one" agency to defer to. The
same idea could also shed light on the Court's recent decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, in which the
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At this point, it is difficult to know how prevalent the dynamics of
litigation-fostered bureaucratic autonomy are, as much of such behavior is
informal and eludes easy systematic study. Indeed, it is difficult to know
how much to focus on the clear instances of information leaked by
agencies being used in briefs and other litigation documents since the
practice might actually come into play before the agency promulgates a
final rule. That is, strategic leaks may put such pressure on the agency that
it simply reverses course and either revisits the policy or decides not to
pursue the policy at all, suggesting that we actually risk underestimating
the effect of litigation-fostered bureaucratic autonomy if we focus solely
on actual litigation. This article is ultimately merely a first cut at what will
have to be a substantial empirical research agenda. However, what this
article has demonstrated is that there is at least some concrete evidence of
the strategic use of administrative law by career staff and that there is also
a relatively favorable incentive structure for such behavior. That insight
alone extends far beyond any temporary vacillation between expertise and
politics and flags a thoroughgoing, structural deficiency in models of
administrative law that focus mostly on political control of the
administrative state.
B. The Challenge to Agency ProcessModels ofDemocraticLegitimacy
Assuming that one is convinced that, at least part of the time, the
political control model is empirically incomplete and that the concept of
litigation-fostered bureaucratic autonomy can highlight its potential gaps,
we are left with a vexing normative challenge: can litigation-fostered
bureaucratic autonomy be reconciled with our expectation that the
administrative state will operate in a democratically legitimate fashion?
This Part explores possible means of justifying the practice of litigationfostered bureaucratic autonomy, ultimately concluding that the practice is
generally consistent with democratic expectations.
1. Analogizing to Agency Process Models ofDemocratic Legitimacy
One possible but ultimately unavailing means of justifying litigationfostered bureaucratic autonomy centers on an analogy to agency process
Court declined to defer to the EPA's decision not to initiate a rulemaking for C02 emissions after
receiving a petition. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 534 (2007). While this decision has been
hypothesized to have arisen due to the court's growing concern about scientific bullying in agencies
during the Bush administration, see Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 41, at 52, it might be more
plausible to see that decision as merely one example of the Court's difficulties in applying concepts of
reasonableness in the face of pervasive dissent, whether expertise driven or not.

JournalofLaw and Politics

172

[Vol.XXVIII: 129

models. These models start from the assumption that, even if Congress and
the President maintain control over administrative agencies when they
want to, the elected branches may intentionally delegate discretion to the
agencies.218 Thus, agency process models start from the same place where
the recognition of litigation-fostered bureaucratic autonomy leaves usCongress and the President are out of the picture. When the elected
branches delegate in this fashion, they nevertheless do so on the
assumption that the agencies' decision-making process will still be
democratically responsive. Whereas the political control model resolves
the agency problem by tracing authority to one of two elected branches,
"agency-centered" conceptions of legitimacy locate democratic control in
the agency's processes, which constrain agencies and ensure that the public
interest is directly represented in the policy-making process.219 It might
therefore be possible to view the deprivation of political control by the
dynamics of litigation-fostered bureaucratic autonomy as justifiable insofar
as the process is sufficiently democratic itself.
Recognizing that elected officials frequently do not directly involve
themselves in regulatory matters, scholars have developed several
"theories of regulation" to classify and assess the various ways that agency
processes democratically legitimize agency action even when the agency is
virtually untethered by the other elected branches.220 One such theorypublic choice theory-is profoundly pessimistic about the regulatory
process, assuming that "agencies deliver regulatory benefits to well
organized political interest groups, which profit at the expense of the
general, unorganized public." 221 The three other major theories are more
optimistic and argue that agency processes are able to further or at least
approximate the public interest, however that concept is defined.
First, neopluralist theories begin from the assumption that there is no
such thing as an independent "public interest," but they nevertheless argue
218 Bressman, Schechter, supra note 5, at 1406 (noting that Congress may delegate simply because
it wants to avoid the electoral repercussions of choosing a side). Congress may also formally commit
issues to agency discretion by law, thereby avoiding judicial review under the Administrative
Procedure Act. See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837-38 (1985). However, such formal
absolute delegation is unnecessary in most situations, as broad delegations to executive agencies are the
norm. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretationsof Law, 1989 DUKE L.J.
511, 516 ("Broad delegation to the Executive is the hallmark of the modem administrative state.").
219 Mendelson, supra note 10, at 585-86. See also Shapiro & Wright, supra note 35, at 578 (arguing
that scholarship has generally overlooked "inside-out" strategies of administrative control such as
relying on internal rules and professionalism to constrain bureaucratic discretion).
220Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98
CoLUM. L. REv. 1, 4 (1998).
221Id. at 5.
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that agency action is democratically legitimate to the extent that it
adequately absorbs inputs from interested constituencies.22 2 Many features
of the "reformation of administrative law" in the 1960s and 1970s reflect
this basic understanding of democratic legitimacy. For instance, the
development of extra-textual informal rulemaking procedure doctrines and
relaxed standing doctrines of this period can be seen as efforts to
encourage or at least validate the participation of a variety of interested
parties in the administrative process.223
Second, public interest theory posits that, even if the role of the public
in agency decision making is more limited than the role of special interest
groups or purposive actors within agencies, "[regulatory] outcomes . . .
will more frequently than not be characterized as general interest" because
of a variety of mechanisms that "reduce principal-agent slack by putting
regulatory issues on the public agenda." 2 24
Third, civic republican theories generally argue that deliberative
processes can reveal the public interest, provided that they are taken
sufficiently seriously and are not simply a sham. As applied to agencies,
various steps in the policy-making process-pre-rulemaking information
gathering,225 notice-and-comment rulemaking, 226 and even post-rulemaking
judicial review 227 -can be sites of deliberation, thus lending democratic
legitimacy and providing epistemic benefits to the quality of decision
making.
The question, then, is whether litigation-fostered bureaucratic autonomy
is similar enough to the processes identified by these various literatures
that it can absorb legitimacy from them. Unfortunately, it does not appear
that it is. The ability of career civil servants to use administrative law to
further their policy preferences at the expense of elected officials seems
patently offensive to most of the theories of democratic justification of the
administrative process. This follows because independent strategic action
by career staff is likely to be unrepresentative or skewed in systematic

222Stewart, supra note 9, at 1712.
223 Id.
224Croley, supra note 220, at 69-70.
225Daniel E. Walters, Note, The Justiciability of Fair Balance Under the Federal Advisory
Committee Act: Toward a DeliberativeProcessApproach, 110 MICH. L. REV. 677, 679-80 (2012).
226 Mendelson, supra note 10, at 586 ("[A]gencies can discern the polity's values through public
participation in agency decisionmaking, including through the notice-and comment rulemaking
requirements."); Seidenfeld, supra note 9, at 1560-61.
227 Seidenfeld, supra note
10, at 1560.
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ways 2 28 (thus disqualifying it under neopluralist theories, which emphasize
interest representation), can be characterized as self-interested (thus
disqualifying it under public interest theory, which emphasizes that agents
generally do not take advantage of principal-agent slack), and is relatively
informal, insulated, and even hidden (thus disqualifying it under civic
republican theories, which emphasize open deliberation 2 29 ).
As Part III.B.2 argues, something like the civic republican model comes
the closest to providing a justification for the kind of career staff resistance
we see in litigation-fostered bureaucratic autonomy dynamics. Such
resistance may produce deliberation that in some sense approximates the
public interest because it increases the range of viewpoints that are
seriously considered by the agency, even if these additional viewpoints are
opposed by political appointees and the President. Yet it seems clear that
even civic republican theorists would probably balk at the idea of insulated
regulators resisting political control, even if that ultimately leads to
something like the deliberative process that civic republican theorists
prefer. Seidenfeld's influential civic republican theory views bureaucratic
agents' discretion as a symptom of a civic republican framework that needs
to be remedied: such a framework has an inherent "inability to ensure that
decisionmakers act with the public interest rather than personal gain in
mind" and, crucially, autonomy may allow the publicly minded regulator
to nevertheless thwart the public interest by "impos[ing] unintentionally
her unique conception of the public good on the polity., 23 0 In response to
these worries, "[c]ivic republicanism . . . must also look to the politically

accountable branches to constrain well-meaning but despotic agencies."23 1
Thus, Seidenfeld's civic republican theory, while explicitly acknowledging
the benefits of agent discretion,232 nevertheless falls back on a distinction
between professional or expert capacity of career staff on the one hand and
strategic capacity on the other.233
228 Career staff could, however, be "thought to act as agents of constituent stakeholders
in a
dialogue on what serves the public interest." Nina A. Mendelson, Rulemaking, Democracy, and

Torrents ofE-mail, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1343, 1351 (2011).

229Mendelson, supra note 10, at 586 (noting that civic republican or deliberative process theories
view "insulated" decision-making processes as posing a danger of "straying" from democratic control,
and suggesting that a modified civic republican view could view some level of presidential control "not
as the central source of legitimacy, but as a safeguard against poor outcomes or skewed deliberation").
230 Seidenfeld, supra note 9, at 1562-63.
231

Id. at 1572.

Id. at 1528 ("Civic republicanism ... posits that no individual acting in her political capacity
should be subservient to other political actors.").
233 Id. at 1554-58 (describing the career staff as deriving its power from "professional
training" and
"job-specific expertise"), 1562-76 (describing various ways that regulators can nevertheless deviate
232
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The problem is that litigation-fostered bureaucratic autonomy might
look like strategic capacity: it might be just another example of agencies'
self-interested tendencies to deliver rents to organized interests under a
public choice account. It is therefore difficult to argue for the democratic
legitimacy of litigation-fostered bureaucratic autonomy under any of the
pure versions of the most common theories of regulation.234 In short,
agency process justifications fail to capture the dynamics of litigationfostered bureaucratic autonomy because they are unwilling to go where the
empirical analysis takes us-that is, to the idea that litigation-fostered
bureaucratic autonomy is value neutral. It is simply a tool and can
theoretically be wielded for any purpose. Agency process models, which
all focus on the public interest, however that is defined, do not purport to
embrace any kind of strategic or even subversive behavior that the
litigation-fostered bureaucratic autonomy hypothesis suggests exists at
least some of the time.
2. The InternalSeparationofPower and the Legitimizing Function of
Litigation-FosteredBureaucraticAutonomy
Though agency process models come close to providing a democratic
justification of litigation-fostered bureaucratic autonomy, they ultimately
reject the idea of overtly self-interested, strategic behavior by career staff
in agencies. Although litigation-fostered bureaucratic autonomy seems
antithetical to these theories, this section of the article argues that
administrative law's empowerment of career constituencies is a welcome
feature and can be justified by a theory of legitimacy that emphasizes the
benefits of widely diffused, overlapping power within the government. I
argue that this is sometimes true even when career agents act solely
because of their own idiosyncratic notions of the public good. In the end,
litigation-fostered bureaucratic autonomy can contribute to moderating the
overreaching control of the administrative presidency, enhance
deliberation, and force transparency and accountability, and though it has
clear costs-namely, possible obstruction and delay-such costs are

from the public interest to the point that other means of political control are necessary to limit
autonomy).
234 This is not terribly surprising. As Professor Steven Croley has noted,
these theories "fail to
incorporate any well developed vision of the administrative process" and "routinely generalize on a
plane of abstraction far above the administrative process, without much attention to the legal
institutions that shape regulatory decisionmaking." Croley, supra note 220, at 6.
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limited by the fact that litigation-fostered bureaucratic autonomy is only
selectively employed.235
a. Checking Executive Overreach
In deconstructing classical accounts of the separation of powers as a
division of authority among the three branches of government, Professor
Elizabeth Magill points out that, to a large extent, the real separation of
power occurs within branches.236 A critical look at the administrative state
reveals that "state power is widely distributed, albeit not only on the threebranch metric" and that "[g]overnment authority is dispersed among many
decisionmakers, and, given their varied incentives, the likelihood of that
authority being consolidated in just a few hands is very small."237 Wide
diffusion of power has both costs and advantages; it may be "chaotic" and
make it "difficult to translate an overwhelming electoral mandate into
dramatic policy change," 2 38 but those same qualities are decidedly positive
in their tendency to moderate overreaching or misinterpretation of the
public interest by elected officials.
Picking up on these ideas and writing in the context of Congress' near
complete abdication of authority to the President in the debate about
military detention during the George W. Bush administration, Professor
Neal Kumar Katyal argued that scholars must begin to seek vindication of
the democracy-promoting values of the separation of powers by moving
from the "first-best concept of 'legislature v. executive' checks and
balances" to the "second-best 'executive v. executive' divisions. 2 39
Though Katyal's focus was on divisions and overlapping missions among
agencies, his critical observation-that widely diffused power within the
executive branch could constrain the excesses of otherwise unconstrained
presidential administrations by balancing the expertise and institutional
knowledge of career staff against the legitimate political imperatives of
235Litigation-fostered bureaucratic autonomy can thus be seen as beneficial in much the same way
that states' means of resistance within the context of cooperative federalism arrangements is beneficial.
Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1284-95
(2009) (describing the benefits of states' resistance within the context of cooperative federalism). Both
phenomena, in addition to being underexplored in the literature, emphasize the deliberation generating
benefits of some level of friction, while also emphasizing that excesses lead to the familiar problems of
principal-agent slack and "petty parochialism." Id. at 1284-85 (noting that the benefits and costs of
states' resistance within the context of cooperative federalism).
236Magill, supra note 48.
237Id. at 654.
238 Id. at 651-52.
239Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation ofPowers: Checking Today's Most Dangerous Branch
from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2316 (2006).
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political appointees-is an insight worth building on and applying to the
phenomenon of litigation-fostered bureaucratic autonomy. Indeed, one of
Katyal's suggestions for building a system of internal separation of powers
is to strengthen civil service protections and the relative power of career
staff within agencies, which is precisely what the litigation-fostered
bureaucratic autonomy thesis asserts has already functionally occurred.240
In short, litigation-fostered bureaucratic autonomy represents a real-life
manifestation of the "internal separation of powers," and it ultimately
realizes the same benefits that Katyal and Magill focus on-i.e., the
limitation of aggregation of power in one branch. For those who are
skeptical of the move to more presidential control of the administrative
state, litigation-fostered bureaucratic autonomy can be seen as taking the
edge off this trend. Providing a meaningful check on presidential control
may do more to honor the rule of law because, even under a robust
political control model, it takes both Congress and the President to create
law, so internal checks on the President's power may in some
circumstances actually produce policy that is more in line with the
bargained-for legal deal. Professor Lisa Bressman has shown that judicial
review of agency action sometimes has this Congress-reinforcing effect,
limiting presidential departures from the legislative deal; 24 1 litigationfostered bureaucratic autonomy can contribute to this function of judicial
review by helping to flag instances of overreaching or violation of the law.
Of course, the internal separation of powers is not without costs. As
Dean Magill notes, wide diffusion and fragmentation of power-of which
litigation-fostered bureaucratic autonomy is a clear example-can result in
paralysis. Yet, as long as the diffusion of power falls short of an absolute
veto power or a means of government actors to pursue their parochial selfinterest at everyone's expense, such wide diffusion and fragmentation may
create an optimal balance of governmental capacity and limitation of
power. Moreover, as the next section argues, the check provided by the
dynamics of litigation-fostered bureaucratic autonomy is likely to further
democratic and deliberative values because of the special perspectives of
career staff. Litigation-fostered bureaucratic autonomy is, in that sense, far
from a check for checks' sake, though it does retain value in slowing down
overreaching in presidential administration.

240
241

Id. at 2328-35.
See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Deference and Democracy, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 761 (2007).

JournalofLaw and Politics

178

[Vol.XXVIII: 129

b. BolsteringDemocraticProcesses
While meaningfully limiting aggregation of power is important,
especially given the evidence of overreaching in presidential
administration in recent years, I am also interested here in the way in
which internal separation of power can dovetail with alternative
democratic theories of legitimacy. In particular, it can help stimulate
genuine recognition of the unique insights and knowledge of career staff.
This kind of acknowledgment is a critical component of deliberative
process theory. As Professor Amy Gutmann and Professor Dennis
Thompson have argued,
Most fundamentally, deliberative democracy affirms the
need to justify decisions made by citizens and their
representatives. Both are expected to justify the laws they
would impose on one another. In a democracy, leaders
should therefore give reasons for their decisions, and
respond to the reasons that citizens give in return.242
Litigation-fostered bureaucratic autonomy can force elected officials
and political appointees to engage in this reason-giving process that is the
essence of deliberative democratic legitimacy. And, unlike the democratic
theories addressed above, which all turned on some notion of the public
interest or on accountability, the deliberative process forced by litigationfostered bureaucratic autonomy can accommodate instrumental, selfinterested behavior on the part of career bureaucrats insofar as it merely
forces political officials to go public with their reasoning or pay the price
in a vacated rule. 24 3 Thus, I argue that litigation-fostered bureaucratic
autonomy potentially improves democratic legitimacy: It can improve the
quality of deliberation by putting pressure on elected officials and political
appointees to provide reasons for their actions, which might, perhaps
counterintuitively, increase the transparency and accountability of agency
policymaking.
Differentiation within agencies that occurs naturally 24 4 and is
heightened through practices of "agency burrowing" can provide
242

AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY? 3 (2004).

243Cf

id. ("[N]ot all issues, all the time, require deliberation. Deliberative democracy makes room
for many other forms of decision-making (including bargaining among groups, and secret operations
ordered by executives), as long as the use of these forms themselves is justified at some point in a
deliberative process.").
244See supra Part
1.
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meaningful epistemic, deliberative benefits to agency decision making
because of its creation of a "greater assurance of political viewpoint
diversity." 245 Litigation-fostered bureaucratic autonomy can contribute to
this viewpoint diversity because career staff have important and unique
perspectives. To the extent that career staff have unique experiences and
institutional knowledge that cannot be simulated or provided by ordinary
notice-and-comment rulemaking, a mechanism that empowers agency staff
and ensures that its voice is heard in the policy-making process will enrich
the informational environment in which a final decision is made.
Clearly, something changes when career staff are more empowered than
presidential appointees, as is demonstrated in Professor David Lewis's
recent empirical study of political appointments and bureaucratic
fi
246
Lewis finds that bureaucratic performance in regulatory
performance.
programs, as measured by OMB's Program Assessment Rating Tool
(PART), decreases with greater numbers of political appointments247 and
that survey data indicate that having greater numbers of political
appointees in agencies lowers perceptions of agency performance
compared with lodging most management tasks in career staffs. 2 48 It is easy
to think of reasons why we might see these patterns: The politicization of
administrative agencies trades off institutional knowledge for political
control, a particularly costly trade in eras of partisan polarization and
frequently changing administrations. 2 49 For instance, agency staff may
have seen efforts to implement a certain idea fail in implementation, and
their insights could help redirect a misguided or shortsighted political
administration before it wastes precious time and resources pursuing that
policy.2 5 0 Empowering or giving voice to career staff can thus provide the
administrative process with a viewpoint that might not otherwise be
provided and can contribute to better policy as a result.251
245

Mendelson, supra note 10, at 644.

246 DAVID E. LEWIS, THE POLITICS OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS: POLITICAL CONTROL AND
BUREAUCRATIC PERFORMANCE (2008).
247Id. at ch.

7.

248

id.

249See Mendelson, supra note 10, at 649 ("Agency employees are uniquely positioned to know and
evaluate agency activities."); Shapiro & Wright, supra note 35, at 611 ("Because of frequent turnover,
political appointees often do not have time to learn enough about their agencies to become effective
managers.").
250 Shapiro & Wright, supra note 13335, at 588 ("Professionalism creates 'neutral competence'
because civil servants are constrained by their training, socialization, and peer relationships to think
beyond the political values of the current White House.").
251
To be sure, civic republican theories can be stretched to cover just this kind of epistemic benefit,
although this would require a relaxation of the usual civic republican requirement that parties aim for
consensus through deliberation and be driven by "public-spiritedness" rather than self-interest. See
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What the internal separation of power adds to the deliberative benefit of
greater career staff participation is a credible threat of resistance. For
deliberation to work, the parties must be partners and must give reasons for
their actions at some point, and as long as there is simply diversity of
viewpoint without a credible threat, deliberation may be thwarted by
political officials. If, on the other hand, career staff are empowered by
administrative litigation in the manner suggested in this article, political
appointees have powerful incentives to commit themselves to genuine
negotiation and deliberation with career staff, thereby ensuring that the
career staff's unique knowledge is not only spoken, but also heard and
incorporated into the final decision. Political actors may also have
powerful incentives to commit themselves to encouraging more robust
public participation in the administrative process in order to validate their
electoral mandate.
The product of the diffusion of power attendant to litigation-fostered
bureaucratic autonomy could thus very well be that all interested parties
face greater incentives to engage with one another and take account of
every group's perspective. To the extent that agency decision-making
processes "take[] place against a backdrop of public preferences that may
be, at the outset, poorly informed or poorly formed," 2 5 2 and especially
when the message of public preferences and public interest has not been
effectively absorbed by elected political actors,253 the credible threat of
litigation-fostered bureaucratic autonomy forces political actors to take
account of the range of viewpoints and perspectives of a variety of
interested constituencies.
Moreover, litigation-fostered bureaucratic autonomy and other forms of
bureaucratic resistance may ultimately further public transparency and
accountability. Though the disputes are typically private, the specific
mechanisms hypothesized as part of litigation-fostered bureaucratic
autonomy-disclosure and litigation-are both public activities in which
almost anyone with resources can participate. More fundamentally,
litigation-fostered bureaucratic autonomy has the potential to encourage
more public operation of administrative agencies in general because it may
discourage reliance on informal means of political control. All else equal,
presidents will usually prefer to operate agencies primarily through
Croley, supra note 220, at 78; Seidenfeld, supra note 9, at 1538 ("[T]he human propensity to pursue
self-interest is not fatal to civic republican theory. Civic republicanism explicitly recognizes this
propensity and responds by demanding institutional constraints that discourage such pursuits.").
252Mendelson, supra note 10, at 642.
253 Id. at 642-43.
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informal, internal guidances and other nonbinding means because of the
flexibility and relative cost-efficiency that those means provide.2 54
Litigation-fostered bureaucratic autonomy discourages this practice
because informal methods do not provide the same level of control of staff
that formal rules do; hence, a president, feeling some resistance from
career staffs at agencies, may decide to (1) utilize more publicly
accountable notice-and-comment rulemaking, and (2) go public with
policy initiatives in an effort to re-claim his electoral mandate.25 5 In either
case, the public benefits from information and attention that it might not
have received if presidents felt like they could informally push through
policy initiatives.
3. Justifying the Costs
To be sure, there are costs accompanying these benefits. Most crucial
here is the danger that the very fracturing that can ensure deliberation will
make governance impossible. This danger is arguably baked right into
deliberative-process-oriented theories. As Professor Steven Croley notes:
[Civic republican theory] seems to allow little room for
irreconcilable differences among participants in regulatory
decisionmaking. What happens, in other words, when
decisionmakers reach an impasse? Here again, merely
positing other-regarding motivations is insufficient.
Participants in regulatory decisionmaking might disagree
about what constitutes desirable regulatory policy, even
taking others' interests and concerns to heart.256
This impasse might be more the norm than the exception, and it is
worse when, as in litigation-fostered bureaucratic autonomy, we have to
acknowledge that there may be self-interested elements. If agency staff are
self-interested or have a strongly held and idiosyncratic view of optimal
public policy, are dissatisfied with the range of options presented by other
deliberators, have a credible threat in litigation-fostered bureaucratic
autonomy, and are able to simply wait out a political administration with
which they disagree, then perhaps the dynamics of litigation-fostered
bureaucratic autonomy will be more obstructive than constructive. This
Id. at 653.
dynamic is strengthened in light of the more stringent Skidmore review that informal
actions receive.
256Croley, supra note 220, at 82 (footnote omitted).
254

255 This
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obstructive effect might be all the worse because of the disparity in time
horizons: 25 7 Especially in the case of a one-term President, litigation
challenging a rule promulgated even immediately upon the President's
taking office could last the entire term.2 58 This delay and uncertainty could
impose serious costs on industry, and, again, it is worth pointing out that
the dangers of obstruction potentially fall on presidential administrations
promoting sensible policy as well as those which are promoting senseless
259
policy.
Admittedly, the possibility of obstruction is a legitimate concem 260 with
support in some literature that presupposes that agency staffs are inherently
unaccountable and self-interested, 26 1 but it is not unanswerable.
First, litigation-fostered bureaucratic autonomy is a fragile tool. When it
works, it works because a judge hears a note that seems out of place. But
judges are anything but unsophisticated listeners, and the strength of the
dissonance can be diluted if the strategy in some way becomes
commonplace. For instance, discord can become so commonplace in a
particular agency that a judge begins to expect dissonance when a case
comes up out of that agency's action. Or perhaps it might even be obvious
in a single case that career staff's disagreement was less than a good faith
effort to contribute to reasoned policymaking, and was instead an effort to
obstruct the policy-making process. Knowing that crying wolf too many
times could alienate even the most willing audience, career staff will
almost certainly temper their use of the strategy, reserving it for only the
most serious occasions of political manipulation. There are many similar,
imaginable ways that litigation-fostered bureaucratic autonomy can lose its
257See GOLDEN, supra note 28, at 20-25 (synthesizing research suggesting that bureaucrats are
uniquely motivated by the public interest and a desire to "do the right thing").
258For example, the NSR litigation lasted well into the second term of the Bush administration. See
supra Part I.B.2.
259In this sense, litigation-fostered bureaucratic autonomy might be viewed as a particularly
senseless contributing cause of the "ossification" of rulemaking that occurs when courts ratchet up
arbitrary and capricious review. For a classic explication of this phenomenon, see Thomas 0.
McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response to Professor Seidenfeld, 75
TEX. L. REV. 525 (1997).
260See PAUL C. LIGHT, THICKENING GOVERNMENT: FEDERAL HIERARCHY AND THE DIFFUSION OF

ACCOUNTABILITY (1995) for a general argument about the dangers of creating multiple layers of
authority.
261 See, e.g., JOHN BREHM & SCOTT GATES, WORKING, SHIRKING, AND SABOTAGE:
BUREAUCRATIC RESPONSE TO A DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (1999); RONALD N. JOHNSON & GARY D.
LIBECAP, THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEM AND THE PROBLEM OF BUREAUCRACY: THE
ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 164-66 (1994); Shapiro & Wright, supra note

13335, at 595 ("In [the economic perspective that dominates the legal and political science literatures],
the bureaucracy cannot be trusted because government employees are rational utility-maximizing actors
who seek, first and foremost, to further their own self-interests.").
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functional force, so while it is undoubtedly a danger that the tool will be
used for costly and unproductive reasons, there is good reason to believe
that it will have an effect only where it should have an effect.
Second, the picture of career agency staff as obstructive and overly selfinterested is in large part misleading. Just because there are self-interested
elements in litigation-fostered bureaucratic autonomy does not mean that
the practice is impossible to reconcile with public-spiritedness: Properly
understood, civic republican theories view "the relationship between civic
virtue and self-interest [as] symbiotic rather than dichotomous."2 62 There is
plenty of evidence that agency staffs are, for the most part, deeply
committed to professionalism, the mission of their agency, and the public
interest.2 63 Agency employees are thus not likely to completely sabotage
the operation of their agency.
Finally, there is a critical difference between civic republican theories,
on the one hand, and deliberative process theories on the other. The former
requires something like consensus approximating the public interest, and
the danger of impasse is not simply a cost to the theory, but potentially
undermines the entire enterprise. The latter, however, does not require
consensus.264 To be sure, the hope is that the reason-giving requirement
will naturally lead to consensus, but there is nothing problematic about
agencies ultimately losing in this process, so long as reasons are given.
Litigation-fostered bureaucratic autonomy, if it is functioning properly,
will be democratically legitimate if it forces political officials to take
account of career staff's demands for reasoning but does not allow the
conflict to collapse into an impasse when there is no consensus. There is no
reason to believe that judges deciding administrative law cases are
incapable of finding this equilibrium and requiring nothing more than that
political officials engage in good faith in a deliberative process with career
staff.265
262Christopher

(1995).

Duncan, Comment, Civic Virtue and Self-Interest, 89 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 147, 147

263See, e.g., Shapiro & Wright, supra note 35, at 599-603 (reviewing
evidence from the public
administration literature, which overwhelmingly finds that agency staff are capable of and in fact do
operate with other-regarding or public-spirited motivations). Shapiro and Wright conclude that, taking
all of the available information into account, "the evidence of bureaucratic behavior suggests that selfinterested behavior and public-interested behavior exist side by side in administrative agencies. The
self-interested behavior does not crowd out other employee conduct. Public-regarding behavior exists
in the bureaucracies, and even persists in administrations hostile to an agency's mission." Id. at 603. See
generally supra notes 25-39 and accompanying text.
264See supra notes 242-243 and accompanying
text.
265Cf Walters, supra note 225, at 702-05 (arguing that judges hearing run-of-the-mill hard look
cases practice precisely this kind of balanced deliberative process).
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Ultimately, the appropriate balance between the three main benefits of
litigation-fostered bureaucratic autonomy-checks on executive overreach,
enhanced deliberation,
and greater public
transparency and
accountability-and the clear costs-primarily, the potentially unlimited
capacity for obstruction-is virtually unknowable in the abstract.
Recognizing a place for litigation-fostered bureaucratic autonomy despite
these costs is much easier when we place the practice in context and
understand the strategy's inherent functional limits. Litigation will usually
be employed to further autonomy very selectively: enough to recognize the
benefits in cases of executive overreaching or myopia, but not enough to
seriously interfere with governance.
CONCLUSION

This article represents a first step toward a greater understanding of the
ways that career staff in administrative agencies can and do use litigationbased mechanisms to resist political control. Scholars of administrative
law, public administration, and political science have focused mostly on
the ways that the elected branches are able to control the actions of
agents-the familiar principal-agent model of administrative control. The
implications of the dynamic identified in this article, litigation-fostered
bureaucratic autonomy (as well as other means of bureaucratic resistance),
are worth taking much more seriously than they have been taken. I have
argued that, if they are sufficiently widespread, these dynamics of
bureaucratic resistance and autonomy suggest limits upon the dominant
theoretical paradigms-the political control model and theories of
democratic legitimacy of discretion in agency processes-and
simultaneously point the way to a conception of administrative law and
procedures that embraces conflict as a means to greater deliberation and
democratic legitimacy. At any rate, scholars must be more attentive to the
potential implications of an administrative state that is not so neatly
controlled as most have assumed.

